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Most durable goods come bundled with limited-term manufacturer-backed warranties at no additional
cost to the consumer. Through the 1990s and early 2000s, the movement towards increased quality in
manufacturing led to greater reliability in durable goods and correspondingly saw drastic expansion in
the manufacturer warranties offered to consumers. At the same time extended warranties continued to be
aggressively marketed by the downstream retailer to durable-goods buyers. In 2012 alone, consumers spent
$14.7 billion on extended service contracts. Extended warranties are optional and need to be purchased at
an additional cost. Consumers purchase extended warranties to insure themselves against the risk of product
failure after the manufacturer warranty expires.
The extant literature is silent on how the provisioning of manufacturer warranties and the market for
extended warranties interact with each other. This doctoral dissertation addresses this research gap in the
empirical context of the U.S. automobile industry. In Essay 1, I investigate the effect of upstream changes in
manufacturer warranties (either expansion or contraction) on downstream retailer outcomes. That is, how
do such changes in coverage of manufacturer warranties impact the purchase rates of extended warranties?
How do the resulting changes in extended-warranty purchase rates vary across products and consumers?
What is the net impact of the changes on the retailers’ financial performance?
In Essay 2, I investigate the effect of upstream changes in manufacturer warranties on auto buyer’s
decision to purchase extended warranties and her choice of extended warranties. Specifically, how do such
changes in coverage of manufacturer warranties differentially impact the auto buyer’s purchase of extended
warranties and the type of extended warranties they purchase? How do the manufacturer-induced changes
impact extended-warranty premiums paid by these auto buyers? What is the net impact of the changes on
the retailer’s profits?
The econometric models advanced in this thesis yield valuable managerial insights on how the markets
for manufacturer warranties and extended warranties interact through the choices made by auto buyers and
their corresponding implications on the financial performance of auto dealers. I hope this dissertation spawns
new ideas for future empirical research on the market for warranties.
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CHAPTER 1: MANUFACTURER WARRANTY AND RETAILERS’ PROFIT
1 Introduction
Personal consumption of durable goods accounts for about 7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (U.S
Federal Reserve System). Most, if not all, durable goods come bundled with some form of a limited-term
manufacturer-backed warranty1 at no additional cost to the consumer (Soberman 2003). Also referred to as
base warranties, these warranties serve as a binding contract made by a manufacturer of the durable good to
the buyer of the good. Herein, the manufacturer assumes specific responsibilities if the purchased product
fails to meet the specifications or legitimate contractual expectations of the buyer (Parisi 2004), including
compensation and/or replacement when the product fails. Therefore, such limited-term manufacturer-backed
warranties operate as a risk-sharing mechanism and insurance against product failure under pre-determined
conditions (Heal 1977; Kelley and Conant 1991)2.
Through the 1990s and early 2000s, the movement towards increased quality in manufacturing led to
greater reliability in durable goods and correspondingly saw drastic expansion in the base warranties offered
to consumers. Across most durable goods, base warranties almost doubled, and manufacturers used their
base warranties as a marketing lever to signal quality and attract new customers (Warranty Week). This
is because consumers treat the provisioning of more expansive base warranties as a credible indicator of
product quality, especially when the quality of the product is not readily observable to consumers (Spence
1977; Murthy and Blischke 2006). Specifically, in equilibrium, product quality can be credibly signaled and
suitably inferred from warranties under two conditions: i) the provision of warranties is costly to the seller,
and ii) the production cost rises with product reliability. Grossman (1981) shows that when the quality of
1Throughout the paper I use manufacturer-backed warranty and base warranty interchangeably.
2Durable goods manufacturers offering such warranties need to be compliant with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the federal
law governing warranties on consumer products (Federal Trade Commission). Passed by Congress in 1975, the Act requires
manufacturers and sellers of consumer products to provide consumers with detailed information about warranty coverage and
strengthens incentives for companies to perform their warranty obligations in a timely and thorough manner. In addition, it
affects both the rights of consumers and the obligations of warrantors under written warranties.The Act gives consumers a way
to know what to expect if something goes wrong, and thus helps to increase customer satisfaction. The guidelines outlined
in the Act ensure that consumers could compare warranty coverage before buying. By comparing, consumers can choose a
product with the best combination of price, features, and warranty coverage to meet their individual needs. In doing so,
the Act promotes competition on the basis of warranty coverage. By assuring that consumers can get warranty information,
the Act encourages sales promotion on the basis of warranty coverage and competition among companies to meet consumer
preferences through various levels of warranty coverage.
1
the product is ex post verifiable, high-quality sellers can distinguish themselves from low-quality sellers by
offering warranties. When a lower-quality firm offers warranty terms comparable to a higher-quality seller, it
will incur very high costs to serve its warranty commitments. This deters a low-quality firm from providing
the same warranty terms as a higher-quality firm. This is what makes the signaling via warranties credible
(Chu and Chintagunta 2011; Kirmani and Rao 2000). Correspondingly, a higher-quality seller will offer
longer and more attractive warranties than a lower-quality-producing competitor.
At the same time that manufacturers expanded their no cost base warranties, extended warranties, which
are optional and need to be purchased at an additional cost (Desai and Padmanabhan 2004; Chu and
Chintagunta 2009, 2011; Jindal 2015), continued to be aggressively marketed by the downstream retailer
to buyers of these durable goods, and significant profits were accrued from such transactions.3 Extended
warranties are purchased by buyers to further insure themselves against the risk of product failure after
the limited-term manufacturer-backed warranty expires. Extended warranties supplement the limited-term
manufacturer-backed warranty and provide a broad array of coverage options.
In 2012 alone, consumers spent $14.7 billion on extended service contracts.4 Yet very little empirical
research exists on this important topic. The few empirical studies that do exist on warranties either investi-
gate the role of limited-term manufacturer-backed warranties (Chu and Chintagunta 2009; 2011) or extended
warranties (Chen et al. 2009; Jindal 2015), but not both. Therefore, the extant literature is quite silent on
how the provisioning of base warranties and the market for extended warranties interact with each other.
Understanding the link between the two types of warranties is both timely and prudent because the ongoing
global economic recession has forced most durable-goods manufacturers to drastically scale back their base
warranties. For example, in the U.S. automobile industry, which serves as our empirical context, in the
mid-to-early 2000s, manufacturers like Chrysler and General Motors rapidly increased the coverage of the
manufacturer-backed warranties on their vehicles to entice customers to their vehicles. As these auto makers
entered and emerged from recession-induced Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as leaner firms, these auto
makers rapidly scaled back their manufacturer-backed warranties. For example, in 2015, both Chrysler and
General Motors announced that they would scale back their manufacturer-backed warranties by as much as
40-percent on several of their vehicles starting in 2016.
1. How do such changes in coverage of manufacturer-backed warranties impact the purchase rates of
extended warranties sold by the downstream retailer?
2. How do the resulting changes in extended-warranty purchase rates vary across products?




3. Last, but not least, what is the net impact of changes in the manufacturer-backed warranties on the
downstream retailers’ financial performance (i.e. revenues and profits)?
Because the empirical literature so far has treated base warranties and the market for extended warranties
as independent markets, the aforementioned managerially relevant research questions remain unexplored.
This study addresses this research gap by exploring the aforementioned research questions in the context of
the U.S. automobile industry, and more specifically the market for used vehicles. The automobile industry is
a vital part of the U.S. economy and contributes approximately 3.6 percent, or $500 billion, to the total GDP
output (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Given its economic significance and rich institutional features,
the automobile industry has had natural appeal for academic inquiry in marketing and economics. The
extant academic literature is rich in insights around pricing (Boyle and Hogarty 1975; Bresnahan 1981;
Berry et al. 1995; Sudhir 2001), consumer-directed price promotions (Pauwels et al. 2004; Bruce et al.
2006), trade promotions (Bruce et al. 2005), channel pass-through (Busse et al. 2006), information search
(Punj and Staelin 1983), leasing versus selling (Desai and Purohit 1998, 1999; Bhaskaran and Gilbert 2005),
new- versus used-car competition (Purohit 1992), consumer-adoption decisions (Schiraldi 2011), dealer-
consumer negotiations (Desai and Purohit 2004), product obsolescence (Levinthal and Purohit 1989), hybrid
car adoption (Huang 2010; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011), etc.
We focus on the used-vehicles market for several reasons. In the U.S., the volume of used-vehicle sales is
larger than new-vehicle sales. Unlike new vehicles, not all used vehicles have residual manufacturer-backed
warranties or the same size of the residual manufacturer-backed warranties. This affords us rich and “pre-
determined” variation in the availability and size of residual base warranties to quantify the interplay between
base warranties and extended warranties. Since the terms of the base warranties are pre-determined (set
well before the vehicle was originally sold in the new-vehicle market) and expire upon the vehicle exceeding
a certain threshold value (mileage and/or time since original purchase), the residual base warranty on a used
vehicle is both deterministic and exogenous. Our empirical strategy exploits this quasi-natural experimental
and pre-determined variation in base warranty residuals. Here, two otherwise identical vehicles may only
differ (marginally) in the presence and in the amount of their residual manufacturer-backed warranties, and
their assignment to either the treatment group (vehicles with expired base warranties) or control group
(vehicles with with residual warranties) is completely deterministic and exogenous. However, even though
our assignment of a vehicle to either the treatment or control group condition is deterministic, the buyers of
these vehicles may still endogenously elect to purchase a vehicle with (or without) residual base warranties.
Therefore, the endogenous sorting of buyers into vehicles presents a unique set of empirical challenges for
causal inference of the impact of residual manufacturer-backed warranties on the purchase rates of extended
warranties.
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We address these unique institutional features of our marketplace, using a regression discontinuity design
using parametric and non-parametric approaches. Our empirical strategy boils down to a comparison of
the extended-warranty purchase-incidence rates just before and just after the expiry of manufacturer-backed
warranties – after conditioning on observable covariates and controlling for unobservables. It affords quantifi-
cation of the causal impact of the presence and the size of the residual manufacturer-backed warranty on the
purchase rates of extended warranties5. We leverage our empirical framework and recovered causal estimates
to conduct a series of counterfactual experiments. Our counterfactual experiments are tailored to evaluate
the impact of sweeping changes to base warranties already enacted (and yet to be enacted) by Chrysler and
General Motors on the purchase rates of extended warranties. Specifically, we assess the impact of these
changes on the auto dealers’ performance (both revenues and profits). Our key findings are as follows:
 If auto makers were to only reduce provisioning of bumper-to-bumper warranties, then vehicles with
lower status-quo bumper-to-bumper warranties will experience a 12
 If auto makers were to only reduce provisioning of powertrain warranties, then all vehicles irrespective of
their status-quo base warranty levels, will experience a very sizable drop in sales of extended warranties.
Specifically, for vehicles with lower (higher) status-quo powertrain warranties retailers could face a 19
 Manufacturer-induced reductions in base warranties also erode both the premiums and profits dealers
realize from selling extended warranties by 7
 Last, but not least, such manufacturer-induced reductions in base warranties also erode the transacted
prices on the vehicles sold and the profits dealers realize from selling vehicles alone.
Our findings have important implications for marketing managers (auto makers and auto dealers), as
they provide valuable guidance on how provisioning of base warranties by the manufacturers (the focus of
much of the theoretical work on warranties) has direct and economically significant impact on downstream
retailers selling extended warranties to used-vehicle buyers. As auto dealers’ margins continue to erode with
greater price transparency afforded to auto buyers today, reductions to base warranties proposed by Chrysler
and General Motors will result in placing even greater financial pressure on the downstream dealer, which
may have other more broader unintended consequences for the U.S. auto industry which is already facing
significant economic turmoil. The rest of the study is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review
the related extant literature. In section 3, we describe our data. This is followed by a detailed review of the
causal-inference-motivated empirical design. The last section concludes with a summary of our findings and
5In such an approach the researcher takes advantages of the fact that the discontinuity induced by the treatment assignment
rule induces a corresponding discontinuity in the outcomes for individuals at the cutoff (Hahn et al. 2001). Specifically, this
discontinuity nonparametrically identifies a local average treatment effect wherein observations immediately to one side of
the cutoff act as a control for observations on the other side, facilitating measurement of a causal effect of the treatment
(Hartmann, Nair and Narayanan 2011).
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directions for future research.
2 Literature Review
Scholarly inquiry on the provisioning of warranties is very rich in theory. Under the assumption that
consumers are risk-averse and firms are risk-neutral, warranties operate as a risk-sharing mechanism (Heal
1977). That is, warranties serve as an insurance against product failure under pre-determined conditions
(Kelley and Conant 1991). Durable goods manufacturers can use warranties as a way to credibly signal
product quality. Spence (1973) was the first to theorize that when the quality of the product is not readily
observable, manufacturers’ provisioning of a warranty is a credible indicator of product quality provided
that: i) the provision of warranties is costly to the seller, and ii) the production cost rises with product
reliability. Grossman (1981) shows that when the quality of the product is ex-post verifiable, high-quality
sellers can distinguish themselves from low-quality sellers by offering warranties. Despite widely accepted
predictions from theory, empirical testing of these theory-driven predictions is scant.
While provisioning of warranties incentivizes the firm to improve the product durability, it also reduces the
incentive for consumers to suitably maintain their product. However, it is important to note that the result
of consumer moral hazard depends on whether maintenance and quality are complements or substitutes.
Consumers may increase the level of effort on a higher-quality product if it is more sensitive to the regular
upkeep and maintenance than a lower-quality product. But effort and quality can also be substitutes. This
happens when a high-quality product rarely fails, regardless of the level of maintenance (Lutz 1989). Since
firms design the terms of their warranty contracts based on a private understanding of the true quality
of their product, the effect of consumer moral hazard and how this impacts purchase rates for extended
warranties pre- and post-expiry of the base warranties remains unexplored.
Warranty provisioning may also help screen potential buyers (Kubo 1986; Matthews and Moore 1987;
Nutz and Padmanabhan 1998; Padmanabhan and Rao 1993; Padmanabhan 1995). Effective screening
facilitates extraction of greater surplus by price-discriminating across these screened consumers (Kubo 1986;
Matthews and Moore 1987; Nutz and Padmanabhan 1998; Padmanabhan and Rao 1993; Padmanabhan
1995). Therefore, firms offer a menu of price-warranty contracts to heterogeneous buyers and, in doing so,
induce consumers to self-select into their preferred warranty terms. The main objective here is to design
a mechanism to efficiently screen consumers with heterogeneous valuations for warranties. Studies in this
domain are variants of models of price-discrimination. The amount of warranty coverage in sorting models
of warranties corresponds to the quantity purchased in a Mussa and Rosen (1987) style price-discrimination
model. A key assumption of the sorting motive is the presence of a heterogeneous preference for risk-aversion
amongst consumers (Grossman 1981; Nutz and Padmanabhan 1998).
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Kubo (1986) shows that a monopolist can increase its expected profit by selling the product with an
optional guarantee contract when consumers have heterogeneous preferences for risk-aversion. In optional
guarantee equilibrium, the market is segmented into consumers with and without the guarantee. Price-
discrimination results in a higher (lower) price on the product with (without) a guarantee than a pure
monopoly solution.6 The firm also serves more of the potential market than in a pure monopoly setting.
Kubo (1986) uses income disparity as a source of self-selection such that affluent consumers exhibit higher
preferences toward the insurance than consumers with fewer means. Sufficient income disparity is necessary
to screen the consumers along their willingness-to-pay for warranties so as to optimally price-discriminate
and realize higher profits.
Matthews and Moore (1987) generalize this notion of screening by solving the monopoly-pricing problem
for a multi-product setting, and show that without providing a high-quality product or a warranty contract
(intended to attract consumers with higher valuations), the monopolist can still specify a high price and
extract a surplus. Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) show that the optimal combination of price and warranty
can increase a manufacturer’s profit in a market where (i) consumers exhibit heterogeneous preference for
risk-aversion, and (ii) there is room for consumer-side moral hazard. Padmanabhan (1995) considers the
role of heterogeneity in consumers’ usage of warranties and consumer moral hazard, which then creates
variation in their willingness-to-pay for a price-warranty contract. These aforementioned studies rely on
the strong assumption that the manufacturer is a monopolist in the product and insurance market. Lutz
and Padmanabhan (1998) introduce a third-party insurance firm to examine the competition effects on
manufacturers’ ability to screen heterogeneous consumers using a combination of price, quality, and warranty.
In addition, consumers are assumed to not observe the true quality of the product. Lutz and Padmanabhan
find that the independent insurer enters the insurance market so as to offer extended warranties for the low-
valuation consumers. While manufacturer profits from the high-valuation consumers remains unchanged, the
presence of an independent insurer causes the manufacturer to drop a product intended for low-valuation
consumers, resulting in a reduction in the overall profits for the manufacturer. Understanding how sorting
amongst buyers (through warranties and prices paid for these warranties) impacts purchase rates for extended
warranties remains an unexplored research question, which is key to how dealers price-discriminate across
buyers.
Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) present a model that designs optimal warranty policy for manufacturers
under the situation in which consumers are heterogeneous in their risk preference, and product failure depends
6 The pure monopoly solution is one in which the firm offers products either with or without a warranty.
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on the level of consumers’ maintenance effort and usage, both of which are unobserved to the firm. Lutz
and Padmanabhan (1995) study why manufacturers offer minimal base-warranty contracts in the presence
of consumer moral hazard in a competitive insurance market. They show that manufacturers’ optimal
strategy is to unbundle the base warranty from the product because bundling creates a cost disadvantage
over an independent insurer. Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) consider the same problem under conditions
of producer moral hazard and the independent insurer. They find that the heterogeneity in risk preference
significantly affects a menu of base warranties, and that the profitability from screening hinges on the degree
of competition with the independent insurer. In the context of channel distribution, Jiang and Zhang
(2011) show that a retailer’s service plan and manufacturer-issued base warranty are substitutes. Jiang and
Zhang (2011) assume that there is no consumer-side moral hazard. The primary goal of these papers is the
development of a theoretical model to design an optimal base-warranty policy when the insurance market is
competitive and consumers vary in their willingness to pay for warranties. In contrast, the objective of the
current study is to identify the casual effect of the presence of a residual base warranty on the demand for
an extended warranty.
Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) examine the effect of the duration of a base warranty on extended-warranty
sales in the new-vehicle market. In their new-vehicle setting, when quality is unobservable, a high-quality
automaker offers more comprehensive base warranty coverage than a lower-quality seller. Longer and more
attractive base warranties reduce consumers’ need for (optional) extended coverage. As a result, the authors
find a marginally significant negative correlation between the average length of the base warranty and the
choice probability of an extended warranty.
As stated previously, despite the rich body of theory, very little empirical research exists on warranties
(either base or extended). The few empirical studies that do exist on warranties either investigate the role
of limited-term manufacturer-backed warranties (Chu and Chintagunta 2009; 2011) or extended warranties
(Chen et al. 2009; Jindal 2015), but not both. Hence, extant literature is quite silent on how the provisioning
of base warranties and the market for extended warranties interact with each other. This dissertation essay
addresses this research gap.
3 Data
We leverage a novel new database from a major auto-industry market-research firm.7 The data provided
to us include detailed transaction-level information for every vehicle purchased at 50 randomly selected
dealerships across Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia between July 2009
7Our non-disclosure agreement prevents us from disclosing the identity of our data source.
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and July 2014. For each transaction, the data contain a VIN identifier of the vehicle purchased, date of
purchase, age of the buyer, ZIP code of the buyer, odometer mileage, etc. We coded up a VIN-decoder that
permits recovery of VIN-specific attributes, including vehicle make, model, trim, model-year, engine size,
the transaction date by the first owner of the vehicle, etc.8 For each transaction, we know information on
the transaction price for the vehicle purchased, whether or not the sale was accompanied by a trade-in, the
price of the trade-in (if any), and the price paid for the extended warranty (if any). In addition, we observe
whether the vehicle purchased was leased, financed or paid in full.
The full dataset contain 135,813 transactions spanning sales of both new and used vehicles. Given our
research objectives, we limited our attention to only used-vehicle transactions made by individual buyers.9
We eliminated observations where the purchased vehicle already included an extended warranty (either
purchased by the previous owner or if the vehicle came certified). We do so because for these vehicles, we
cannot directly ascertain the warranty residuals (at the point of purchase) and/or the incremental price paid
for the inclusion of the extended warranty by the current buyer10. Base warranty coverage is good until
the used vehicle reaches the mileage or year cutoff, whichever comes first. For example, a two-year-old used
car with the odometer mileage of 40,000 miles is expired in the bumper-to-bumper warranty if its warranty
coverage is good until 3-years and/or 36,000 miles. Likewise, a four-year-old used car with 20,000 miles
of vehicle is also considered as post-expiry used vehicle since it crosses the year threshold of the warranty
coverage. In our empirical setting, we remove the observations in which only one of two warranty coverage
thresholds goes over the thresholds. Hence, our sample contains expired-base-warranty used-vehicles that
exceed both year and mileage thresholds11.
Since vehicle VINs do not directly contain information on the manufacturer-backed factory warranties, we
augmented our sales-transactions database with auxiliary data obtained from Cars.com and the respective
auto makers websites. We report the factory-warranty terms across key manufacturers and their brands in
Table 1. As seen in Table 1 , there is rich variation in factory-warranty terms across manufacturers. In
the auto industry, factory warranty comes in two forms. Basic warranty or “bumper-to-bumper” policy
covers the cost of most repairs except normal wear and tear (such as replacement of oil filters). The
8We built our VIN-decoder using the yearly-vehicle-attribute details generously provided to us by our data source.
9The data released include all types of sales made at these dealerships. These include individual, fleet and B2B sales. Since
the economic motives for these agents differ drastically from individual buyers, we left these out of our empirical analysis.
Individual transactions were screened based on whether birth dates were included for the buyers.
10Certified programs often extend the limited-term manufacturer-backed warranty in concert with other testing and maintenance
services. Herein the price of the extension to the limited-term manufacturer-backed warranty is never reported/unbundled
from the price of the other services included.
11In the robustness section, we also test the stability of our model parameters if we were to limit our treatment assignment on
the basis of the vehicle exceeding the pre-defined cutoff on only one of the two running values.
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power-train warranty on the other hand, covers major internal parts of the vehicle such as the engine and
transmission. As shown in Table 1, basic warranties are in effect between two through five years from
the date when the factory warranty is activated.12 The most commonly occurring basic warranties are 3-
years/36,000 miles (41.46%), 4-years/50,000 miles (39.02%), and 5-years/60,000 miles (7.31%). Power-train
warranties have more expansive coverage than basic warranties. They range anywhere from two to ten years.
The 4-years/50,000 miles (24.39%), 5-years/60,000 miles and 5-years/100,000 miles (21.95%) are the most
commonly occurring power-train warranty terms.
Both the basic and power-train warranty terms vary across manufacturers. For example, Ford (brands
include Ford and Mercury), Toyota (brands include Toyota and Scion), Nissan, Honda, Subaru, Mazda and
Volkswagen provide a power-train warranty coverage for 5-years/60,000 miles. In contrast, General Motors
(brands include Chevrolet, GMC, and Pontiac) and Chrysler (with Chrysler and Dodge) offer 5-years/100,000
miles coverage. Even within a manufacturer, warranty terms vary across brands. For example, General
Motors, Honda, Nissan and Toyota offer two policies, and Ford provides three policies, across different
brands within their product portfolios. However, warranty coverage remains the same across models within
the same brand (for example, Hyundai Elantra and Hyundai Sonata both have 5-years/60,000 miles and
6-years/100,000 miles coverage). Amongst manufacturers with multiple warranty policies, the most widely
offered combination of basic and power-train warranties includes the 3-years/36,000 miles and 5-years/60,000
miles (35.29%) coverage plans. As stated previously, since these factory-warranty terms are set well before
the vehicle even entered the new vehicle market, in the empirical analysis that follows, the exogenous
heterogeneity in these limits will serve as rich source of naturally occurring variation that we will exploit for
identification.
In addition to manufacturer-backed factory warranties, buyers (of both new and used vehicles) have
the option to extend the duration of their purchased vehicle’s factory-warranty coverage by purchasing
an extended warranty. Similar to the factory-warranty terms, auto manufacturers offer a fairly differenti-
ated menu of extended-warranty plans. For example, Honda and Mazda sell one extended-warranty policy,
while General Motors, Nissan, and Toyota present three varying coverages for the extended warranties
they underwrite. Ford and Volkswagen provide the most differentiated extended-warranty plans, with four
and five products, respectively. The specific terms of extended warranties also vary across auto makers.
The Ford-PremiumCARE plan covers 13 major auto parts with deductibles of $0 to $100 with varying
year/mileage limits (1/12,000 to 5/75,000).13 Toyota Certified Platinum VSA overlaps the most with Ford-
12Usually, this happens when the vehicle is first sold after it is delivered from the assembly plant.
13These include the engine, transmission, rear-wheel-drive axle, front-wheel-drive axle, steering, brakes, front and rear suspen-
sion, electrical, air conditioning, emissions, audio and the safety. These details were obtained from Ford’s website.
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PremiumCARE’s coverage in terms of components, but differs along other dimensions (7-years/100,000 miles
versus 8-years/125,000 miles). Extended warranties can be sold either by the manufacturer, the dealer or a
third-party. Manufacturers sell extended warranties either direct-to-the-consumer or through their expansive
franchised dealer-network. General Motors is the only exception. Ally Financial Inc. runs GM’s extended
warranty business. Additionally, well-established third-party warranty companies such as GE Capital, Lu-
brico, Global, and Pafco underwrite the extended warranty contracts sold by dealers (Soberman 2003). Table
2 presents details on the extended warranties offered by select manufacturers.14
Figure 1 shows the variation in the purchase rates of extended warranties across vehicles with varying
odometer mileage. The raw data reveal an interesting pattern. The unconditional purchase rates of extended
warranties rise with odometer miles up until 40K miles and then starts to fall as the vehicle gets older.
However, this pattern does not shed any light on how these rates vary with: (a) the terms of the factory
warranties, (b) quality, and (c) across auto makers.
In Figures 2 and 3, we report the purchase rates of extended warranties across vehicles with 60K versus
100K powertrain warranties. Visual inspection of these plots suggests that on average the purchase rates of
extended warranties on vehicles with more expansive manufacturer-backed warranty is lower than those with
less expansive manufacturer-backed warranty. This pattern lends some support to predictions from theory
that if manufacturers use factory warranties to signal quality, then the variation in purchase rates in Figure
2 can be attributed to differences in perceived quality.
To directly explore if our extended warranty purchase rates vary with objective measure of quality, we
augment our sales data with vehicle quality from J.D. Power15. Figures 4 and 5 show how the purchase rates
of extended warranty varies with quality. These plots highlight a very interesting pattern in our data. Note
that the extended warranty purchase rates for lower quality vehicles (Figure 4) is higher than that for higher
quality vehicles (Figure 5) for vehicles with fewer odometer miles. However the relative extended warranty
purchase rates reverse for older vehicles with more odometer miles. Since higher quality vehicles are less
likely to face repairs early in their usage cycle than their lower quality counterparts, this is borne out in lower
purchase rates of extended warranties for newer higher quality vehicles than the similar age lower quality
peers. As vehicles get older, repairs when needed, for a higher quality vehicle become more expensive than
similar repairs for their lower quality counterparts, which may explain the reversal of the relative purchase
rates as vehicles get older.
Figures 6 though 9 illustrates the differential purchase rates of extended warranties across select brands
14Ford does not offer zero deductibles for used vehicles.
15J. D. Power is the industry standard for quality ratings.
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which vary by the size of the factory warranties. Herein, Ford Fusion and Chevrolet Malibu constitute the
midsize car segment, while Chevrolet Silverado and GMC Sierra constitute the large heavy duty pickup
segment.16 Ford Fusion comes with a 3-years/36,000 miles bumper-to-bumper and a 5-years/60,000 miles
powertrain warranty. Chevrolet Malibu on the other hand offers a 3-years/36,000 miles bumper-to-bumper
and a 5-years/100,000 miles powertrain warranty. As seen in the figure, the mean purchase rates vary quite
a bit across these two vehicles even within the same industry segment. The mean purchase rate for extended
warranties are higher for Ford Fusion than similar aged vehicles of Chevrolet Malibu. Furthermore, the
purchase rates leading up to the expiry of the bumper-to-bumper warranty drop for Ford Fusion but rises for
Chevrolet Malibu. While the mean purchase rates of extended warranties drop with mileage for both brands,
the purchase rates of extended warranties rises leading up the expiry of Ford Fusion’s powertrain warranty
while it remains somewhat constant for Chevrolet Malibu. Leading up to the expiry of the base warranties,
the purchase rates of extended warranties is higher for Ford Fusion than Chevrolet Malibu. Here, too, as
theory suggests if manufacturers use factory warranties to signal quality, then the variation in purchase rates
in Figure 4 can be attributed to differences in perceived quality.
Chevrolet Silverado and GMC Sierra come with more expansive factory warranty coverage than their mid-
size segment peers. Both brands come with 3-years/36,000 miles bumper-to-bumper and a 5-years/100,000
miles powertrain warranty. As seen in the figure, the mean purchase rates vary quite a bit across these
two vehicles even within the same industry segment offering and the same factory warranty coverage. Note,
that the purchase rates of extended warranties leading up to the expiry of the bumper-to-bumper warranty
drops for GMC Sierra but remains fairly constant for Chevrolet Silverado. While the mean purchase rates
of extended warranties drop with mileage for Chevrolet Silverado it seems to rise with mileage for GMC
Sierra. Specifically, the purchase rates of extended warranties rises leading up the expiry of GMC Sierra’s
powertrain warranty while it drop for Chevrolet Silverado.
For our empirical analysis, we limited the set of brands in which the cumulative sales exceeds 100 units.
Collectively, these included brands account for 76.1% of all the used-vehicle sales in our sample. After
applying the aforementioned screening criteria, our final estimation sample consists of 12,603 observations
(or about 9.3% of the transactions originally contained in our database). Our estimation sample spans
12 dealers, covers 8 auto makers and 42 brands, and includes a total of 369 unique make-model-dealer
combinations. Table 3 contains summary statistics for the key variables of interest.
16We use J.D Power’s auto industry classification for this illustration. Details on their classification hierarchy can be found at
J.D. Power Auto Segments.
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4 Empirical Strategy
New vehicles (for the most part) have their entire factory-warranty coverage intact at the time of pur-
chase. This leaves little variation to assess how buyers trade off factory warranties against optional extended
warranties. However, used vehicles vary drastically in age and mileage. Correspondingly, this induces nat-
ural variation in factory-warranty residuals across transacted vehicles. Because factory-warranty terms are
pre-determined (set at the time the vehicle was manufactured), these terms cannot be strategically manip-
ulated by either the previous owner or the dealer. Herein, the factory warranties expire upon select vehicle
characteristics exceeding a pre-determined set of threshold values. We exploit this rich and pre-determined
variation in the availability and size of residual-factory warranties to quantify the trade-off that buyers make
between factory (basic and power-train) and extended warranties.
Our empirical setting, therefore, lends itself nicely to a regression-discontinuity-based quasi-experimental
design, which also affords us a reliable causal inference. The regression-discontinuity (RD) approach is a
quasi-experimental research design in which observational units are assigned to a treatment based on whether
their value of an observed covariate is above or below a known cutoff. This discontinuous jump induces
“variation” in the treatment assignment that may be regarded as being unrelated to potential confounders
for observations near the cutoff or threshold. In our empirical setting, too, the likelihood of receiving a
treatment (i.e. a vehicle with an expired base warranty) jumps sharply based on an observable covariate
of the purchased vehicle (mileage of the vehicle). Using an RD-based-causal-inference-design approach, we
estimate the average local effect (of the expiry of the base warranty on purchase rates of extended warranties).
Specifically, we quantify the impact of the expiry of each type of base warranty on the purchase rates of
extended warranties in the region “local” to the expiry of the respective base warranties. In the section
below, we first discuss the RD design more generally, followed by a detailed exposition of the sharp RD
approach that we take to our data.17
4.1 Overview of Regression-Discontinuity Design
Researchers are often interested in the causal effect of a binary intervention or treatment. Units may be
individuals, firms, products (a unique vehicle in our setting), etc. Each of these units is either exposed or
not exposed to a treatment. The effect of the treatment is potentially heterogeneous across units. Let Yi(0),
and Yi(1) denote the potential outcomes when observational unit i = 1, 2, . . . , n, is not exposed and when it
is exposed to a treatment, respectively. If we had access to panel data wherein every time the observational
unit is observed, the unit is randomly assigned to either the treatment or control condition. Then, we would
17For a more expansive review of the technical details, the reader is referred to Lee and Lemieux (2010), Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Van der Klaauw (2008).
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simply focus on the differences Yi(1) − Yi(0) to make a causal inference. Unfortunately, in most empirical
settings, we never observe the pair Yi(0), and Yi(1) together. This problem arises because most often the
researcher either has one observation per unit (as is the case in our empirical setting) or the unit is either in
the treatment or control condition (in a panel setting). Causal inference, therefore, typically focuses on the
average effects of the treatment Yi(1) − Yi(0) across units, rather than on unit-level effects. For unit i, we
observe the outcome corresponding to the treatment received. Let Wi ∈ {0, 1} denote the no treatment and
the treatment condition of unit i respectively. The observed outcome can be expressed as:
Yi = (1−Wi) ∗ Yi(0) +Wi ∗ Yi(1) =

Yi(0) if Wi = 0
Yi(1) if Wi = 1
The unique feature of the RD design is that assignment to the treatment is determined, either completely
or partly, by the value of a predictor Xi (which has a continuous support, ex. mileage in our setting) being
on either side of a fixed threshold. Additionally, predictor Xi itself can have a direct impact on the potential
outcomes. Therefore, any discontinuity in the conditional distribution of the outcome Yi(•) as a function of
this covariate – at the cutoff value – is interpreted as evidence of a causal effect of the treatment.
Such treatment assignments often arise in practice. For example, in Thistlethwaite and Campbell’s (1960)
original application of the RD method, an award was made to students whose test score was higher than a
minimum score on a scholarship examination. Hahn et al. (1999) study the effect of an anti-discrimination
law that only applies to firms with at least 15 employees. In the seminal Card et al. (2008) study, eligibility
for medical services through Medicare is pre-determined by age. In Ludwig and Miller (2007), the Head Start
program funding rates are governed by Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) cutoffs.18 Matsudaira (2007)
investigates the effect of a remedial summer-school program that is mandatory for students who score less
than some cutoff level on a test. In our empirical setting, treatment occurs when the mileage on a vehicle
reaches and/or exceeds a certain pre-determined mileage cutoff. Specifically, upon reaching this mileage
cutoff, the manufacturer-issued basic and/or power-train warranty gets voided.
In the sharp RD setting (SRD), the assignment to the treatment Wi is a deterministic function of one (or
many) covariates, each of which is observed and has continuous support. Let X denote the forcing variable
(or treatment-assignment variable), then Wi = 1(Xi ≥ z). Herein, all units with a covariate value of at
least z are assigned to the treatment group, and all units with a covariate value of less than z are assigned
to the control group. In this design, the average causal effect of the treatment is the discontinuity in the
conditional expectation of the outcome, given the covariate at the discontinuity point. Formally:
18Head Start program was established in 1965 as part of the War on Poverty initiative. The federal program provides preschool,
health and other social services to poor children age three to five and their families.
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τSRD = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Xi = z] = lim
x↓z
E[Yi|Xi = z]− lim
x↑z
E[Yi|Xi = z] (1)
Recall that matching-type treatment-effect estimators are grounded in the “unconfoundedness” assump-
tion (see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Imbens, 2004). That is:
Yi(0), Yi(1) ⊥Wi|Xi (2)
This assumption readily holds in SRD because conditional on the covariates, there is no variation in the
treatment. Matching-type approaches also require that for all values of the covariates, the data contain both
treated and control units.
0 < Pr(Wi = 1|Xi = z) < 1 (3)
This assumption by construction does not hold in SRD design. Instead, in SRD, for all values of x, the
probability of assignment is either 0 or 1, rather than always between 0 and 1. As a result, there are no
values of x with overlap. Therefore, SRD warrants the unavoidable need for extrapolation. However, in
large samples, the amount of extrapolation required to make inferences is arbitrarily small, as we only need
to infer the conditional expectation of Y (w) given the covariates, ε away from where it can be estimated. So
as to avoid non-trivial extrapolation, we focus on the average treatment effect at Xi = z. That is:
τSRD = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Xi = z] = E[Yi(1)|Xi = z]− E[Yi(0)|Xi = z] (4)
However, by design, there are no units with Xi = z for which we observe Yi(0). We therefore exploit
the fact that we observe units with covariate values arbitrarily close to z. However, in order to justify this
averaging, one needs to assume smoothness, which is often formulated in terms of conditional expectations
(Hahn et al. 2001).
Taking advantage of the local continuity condition enables us to make individual units in a neighborhood
of Xi = z comparable. Therefore, by comparing the average outcomes just above and below the threshold,
now we can identify the average treatment effect for units close to the forcing variable/covariate cutoff value.19
In the simplest case, flexible estimation of RD treatment effects approximates the regression function of the
outcome near the cutoff value of the forcing/running variable for control and treated groups separately, and
computes the estimated effect as the difference of the values of the regression functions at the cutoff for each
19Before employing the RD approach, researchers need to test the validity of these RD design requirements for their individual
empirical settings (Lee 2008).
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group:
−hn ≤ Xi < z : z ≤ Xi ≤ hn :
Yi = α− + (Xi − z) · β− + ε−,i Yi = α+ + (Xi − z) · β+ + ε+,i
(5)
Correspondingly, the treatment effect at the cutoff off the running variable is given by:
τ̂SRD = α̂+ − α̂− (6)
As noted above, RD design is predicated on comparing treated and untreated units in a region “near”
the cutoff value of the running/forcing variable. Several approaches have been advanced to date to identify
observations that constitute being sufficiently “near.” These approaches vary from being completely ad hoc
to methods that are grounded in exploiting the variation in the data. The latter are collectively referred
to as bandwidth-selection estimators. Bandwidth-selection estimators help choose the optimal bandwidth h
around Xi = z, i.e., the cutoff of the running variable. In the most general form, the bandwidth-selection
estimator tries to strike a delicate balance between prediction accuracy and the precision of an estimator in
the region around the cutoff. On the one hand, a larger bandwidth affords the researcher more observations,
and in doing so, helps the researcher obtain more precise estimates of the treatment effect. However, a model
applied to a large bandwidth is more likely to suffer predictive inaccuracy. Furthermore, if the underlying
conditional expectation of the outcome is non-linear, then a linear model may still be a good approximation
within a narrow bandwidth. However, a linear parameterization may be unable to accurately approximate
variation in the data over a wider bandwidth. Therefore, the key intuition for bandwidth selection is that
one needs to trade off the bias and the variance of τ̂SRD(hn). Heuristically:
↑ Bias(τ̂SRD) =⇒ ↓ ĥ and ↑ Var(τ̂SRD) =⇒ ↑ ĥ
There are two approaches for data-driven bandwidth selection: (i) cross-validation, and (ii) direct plug-in
rules based on mean square error (MSE) expansions.20 The direct plug-in (DPI) approach is based on an
MSE expansion of the sharp RD estimators, leading to the MSE-optimal choice:
ĥ = Ĉ · n−1/5 (7)










In the expressions above, B and V are the leading asymptotic bias and variance of the RD estimator.
In practice, one discards 50% of the observations on either side of the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux
2008). Ludwig and Miller (2007) implement their bandwidth-selection procedure by using only data within
5 percentage points of the threshold on either side. If the curvature of the density of the running variable is
similar on both sides close to the cutoff point, then in large samples, the optimal bandwidth will be similar
on both sides of the cutoff. In the case of the cross-validation-based approach to bandwidth selection:




w(Xi) (Yi − µ̂1(Xi, h))2 (9)
The cross-validation approach boils down to selecting an optimal bandwidth h that minimizes the MSE
between the predicted and actual Y . The limitation of cross-validation is that the bandwidth-selection
criterion is evaluated over the entire support of X, as opposed to the distribution of the running variable
only around the cutoff z. For this reason, in our empirical analysis, we limit our analysis to the direct plug-in
bandwidth-selection estimators. Specifically, we run our analysis using the estimator proposed in Calonico
et al. (2014).
4.2 Model specification
In much of the empirical literature focused on recovery of the treatment effects (including the difference-
in-difference approach), the researcher will estimate a regression function across the entire sample of treated
and control units of the form:
logit (Pr (Ydjst = 1|Mileagedjst, Xdjst)) = log
(
Pr (Ydjst = 1|Mileagedjst, Xdjst)
1− Pr (Ydjst = 1|Mileagedjst, Xdjst)
)
= β0 + β1 ∗Ddjst + β2 ∗Mileagedjst
+β3 ∗Ddjst ·Mileagedjst
+γ ∗Xdjst + εdjst
This approach has some undesirable properties. First, the resulting estimator puts uniform weight across
all observational units when estimating the model. In our empirical setting, this would amount to not
distinguishing between used vehicles whose mileage is far away from the cutoff from those whose mileage is
very proximate to the cutoff. It is reasonable to assume that vehicles with odometer readings that are far
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away from the cutoff are qualitatively very different than those that are closer to the cutoff. These qualitative
differences may stem from different levels of wear-and-tear, maintenance, number of previous owners, etc.
Since these are unobservable to the econometrician, the recovered treatment effect may suffer bias. However,
these qualitative differences, while not absent, can be lessened when one limits the estimation to a “narrow”
region around the cutoff.
So as to mitigate this concern, we use the SRD design outlined above. In our specific empirical setting,
the running variable is the odometer mileage of the used vehicle being purchased. As discussed in the data
section, manufacturer-backed factory warranties include basic and power-train warranties. Each of these
factory warranties expires when the vehicle reaches the pre-determined basic or power-train warranty terms
(e.g., 3 years/36,000 miles or 5 years/60,000 miles). The treatment assignment is deterministic in mileage (a
requirement for SRD) for two reasons: i) the expiry of a base warranty is decided at pre-determined levels;
ii) base warranties are defined to be expired if either mileage or age of the used vehicles exceeds the base
warranty thresholds.21 Therefore, using the approach outlined above affords us the ability to answer the
following question: By how much do purchase rates of extended warranties for used vehicles discontinuously
change at the point when the vehicle hits the pre-determined factory-warranty-expiry level?
But the demand for extended warranties can also depend on other covariates in addition to the forcing
covariate that is the basis of the assignment mechanism in our RD design. Including other covariates can help
eliminate sample biases present in the model specification outlined above and improve the precision of our
treatment effect estimate τ̂ . In addition, they can be useful for evaluating the plausibility of the identification
strategy (more on this later). For example, vehicle characteristics such as the automobile manufacturer, auto
brand, and car model might systematically impact purchase rates for extended warranties. Purchase rates
can also be impacted by non-vehicle-related factors such as characteristics of the auto dealership (aggressive
sales force, franchised/non-franchised site, exclusive underwriter of extended warranties in the market, etc.)
and characteristics of the auto buyer’s local market (average road-driving conditions, number of repair shops
and average cost of repairs, etc.).
To address these empirical issues, we estimate the SRD in the following steps. First, we employ the
bandwidth-selection estimator advanced in in Calonico et al. (2014) (henceforth CCT). The bandwidth-
selection estimators rely on non-parametric, local-polynomial approximation. The resulting bandwidth per-
mits us to exploit only the variation in the observations around the neighborhood where the basic/power-train
warranty of the specific vehicle expires. For robustness, we also use a subset of two fixed bandwidths around
the threshold to test for sensitivity to the selected bandwidth. Next, we calibrate a logistic regression where
21In the robustness section, we also test the stability of our model parameters if we were to limit our treatment assignment on
the basis of the vehicle exceeding the pre-defined cutoff on only one of the two running values.
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the dependent variable is a logit transformation of conditional probability of the buyer of a used vehicle j,
buying an extended warranty for her vehicle from dealer d located in state s at time t, and parameterized
as:
logit (Pr (Ydjst = 1|Mileagedjst, Xdjst)) = log
(
Pr (Ydjst = 1|Mileagedjst, Xdjst)
1− Pr (Ydjst = 1|Mileagedjst, Xdjst)
)
= β0 + β1 ∗Ddjst + β2 ∗Mileagedjst
+β3 ∗Ddjst ·Mileagedjst
+γ ∗Xdjst + εdjst, hn ≤Mileage ≤ hn
where Ddjst is an indicator variable for the expiry of the base warranty for a used vehicle (i.e., takes on
value 1 when zbasic/power−train cutoff ≤ Mileagedjst ≤ hn and 0 otherwise). Mileagedjst is the odometer
mileage of the used car, hn is the bandwidth proposed by CCT and/or fixed bandwidths, and Xdjst includes
other vehicle, dealer and buyer-market characteristics.
Extended warranties are marketed only after the buyer commits to a specific vehicle. However, transacted
prices on the vehicle purchased may still impact extended-warranty-purchase-probability. If transaction price
proxies for vehicle unobservables, including product quality, then consumers may associate higher-quality
products with greater reliability, which may therefore result in a reduced likelihood to purchase extended
warranties. Another possibility is that a budget-constrained buyer, upon paying a higher transacted price
on the vehicle, may have fewer additional resources to spare for purchasing extended warranties. This,
too, would reduce the likelihood of a buyer purchasing extended warranties. However, if higher prices also
translate to more expensive-to-maintain vehicles, then the buyer may be more likely to purchase extended
warranties to insure against product failure. Therefore, the net effect of the used-vehicle-transacted prices
on purchase probability of the extended warranty remains an open empirical question.
To quantify this net effect in the region “local” to the expiry of the warranty, we include the vehicle
transacted price as an additional covariate. Buyer characteristics such as age, income, and whether there
is a co-buyer are included to control for consumer unobservables. For example, a large body of theoretical
research on insurance presumes the negative association between the income and the demand for insurance
based on the fact the risk aversion decreases with the income (e.g., Mossin 1968). However, such assumption
often lacks the empirical support. For example, Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) finds the positive relationship
between the income and the probability of purchasing the insurance, while Browne and Hoyt (2000) reports
the opposite effect of income. Thus, we are agnostic about the directional effect of income but use it as a
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control for consumer’s unobserved risk preference. Time-invariant dealer- and buyer-market unobservables
are controlled via dealer- and buyer-market fixed effects. To control for aggregate time-varying unobservables
(seasonality, weather, gas prices, etc.), we include year and month dummies. 22 Finally, εdjst captures other
drivers that impact buyers’ extended warranty-purchase decisions but are unobserved to the econometrician,
and that are specific to the product and vary by dealer, state, transacted year and month. Our key parameters
of interest are β1 and β3. β1 estimates the average effect of the basic/power-train warranty expiry on the
probability of choosing an extended warranty. β3 allows a varying slope for the impact of vehicle mileage
pre- and post-expiry of the basic warranty.
To safeguard against any risk that our recovered treatment effects are subject to the functional-form
assumptions we take to our data, we also conduct non-parametric RD where we place no functional form
assumptions on the density of our data. Our non-parametric RD estimates rely on triangular edge kernels
centered at the base-warranty-expiry thresholds, rather than a uniform kernel that underlies our parametric
estimation. We examine the difference in the treatment effect of base warranty expiry by fitting local linear
functions of the running variable using a triangular kernel to the left and right of the expiry cutoff23. For
robustness, we test for sensitivity to the selected bandwidth by re-estimating the RD treatment coefficient
for a subset of two fixed bandwidths around the threshold. For each of our optimal bandwidths, we provide
robust variance estimators following Calonico et al. (2014)24.
5 Threats to Identification
The validity of the RD design is predicated on the notion that there is no discontinuity at the RD thresh-
old except the treatment. Identification in the RD model relies on the assumption that the distribution of
consumer’s (unit’s) unobservable characteristics, conditional on the running variable, does not discontinu-
ously change at the threshold (Hahn et al. 2001 p. 204 Assumption 3). Consumers on either side of the
cutoff threshold are thus comparable except for their treatment assignments. Thus the treatment effect can
be identified by comparing the purchase of extended warranties on either side of the threshold in the limit
approaching the treatment threshold. Identification may be compromised if: : i) consumers are able to
precisely manipulate their location relative to the threshold based on their unobserved risk preference; ii) if
auto dealers knowing that purchase rate of extended warranty discontinuously changes, behave strategically
22Copeland (2014) highlights seasonality in consumer mix. Since auto makers frequently use cash-back rebates at the end of
the model year to boost sales, consumers time their purchase decisions to avail of lower prices. Including month fixed-effects
helps control for sorting/strategic timing of purchase by deal-prone buyers.
23A recent working paper by Gelman and Imbens (2014) argues against using higher polynomials as these can bias the RD
coefficient estimates. We follow their recommendation and therefore limit to local linear functions of the running variable..
24Calonico et al. (2014) corrects for the non-negligible bias in the distributional approximation of subjective bandwidth choices.
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by offering significantly different marketing-mix on either side of the expiry threshold so as to increase the
auto buyer’s extended warranty purchase likelihood (Purohit 1995; Zhu et al. 2008).
However, it is important to note that consumers on either side of the cutoff is comparable even if the
manipulation exists. Like in Angrist and Rokkanen (2015)’s example, provided that students know the
presence of pass/fail cutoff, students expecting the exam scores to be close to the cutoff value may exert
more effort than those who thinks their scores are enough to get in the prestigious schools. Even with
such an incentive for students to be strategic, student’s distribution of effort just to the left of the cutoff
should be no different from that to the right of the cutoff. Hence, we can identify the casual effect of
attending the prestigious school for the students at the cutoff. This setup where the existence of pass/fail
is public knowledge fits to our empirical context, since the expiry of manufacturer warranty is known to
the consumer. Gerard et al. (2017) make more general argument that insofar as manipulation leads the
conditional distribution of unit’s unobservable characteristics to change in a discontinuous manner at the
cutoff, casual effect is identified using an RD design.
While the discontinuity of consumers’ unobservable characteristics cannot be tested directly, McCrary
(2008) argues that a discontinuous jump or drop at the cutoff in the density of running variable indicates
that a RD design is compromised with the manipulation, hence, loses the validity of the empirical approach.
In the applied literature the test proposed by McCrary (2008) has become a well-accepted practice to empir-
ically examine treatment manipulation concerns (also known as strategic sorting). Specifically, researchers
test the null hypothesis that the density of the running variable varies smoothly around the cutoff. If the
null hypothesis is not rejected, typically they presume that no manipulation occurs and proceed with their
empirical analysis. However, if this null hypothesis is rejected, the corresponding treatment cutoff is no
longer used for inference. Following this tradition, we implement McCrary (2008) test for discontinuities
in the density of the running variable, odometer mileage of the used vehicle. Results are shown in Tables
4 and 5. The estimate and corresponding confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 5. The coefficients
of 0.091 and 0.264 at the threshold of bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty coverages are statisti-
cally insignificant, suggesting that the manipulation of running variable is absent. However, we do detect
discontinuities in the density of our running variable at the seventy-thousand and hundred thousand miles
cutoffs. As recommended by McCrary (2008) and as is customary in the empirical studies using regression
discontinuity designs, we do not use these two base warranty cutoffs for treatment effect inference or for our
counterfactuals.
To allay any concerns of strategic manipulation by the retailer in response to consumer’s reaction of
expiry of base warranties, we check if the observed consumer- and auto dealer-specific covariates exhibit
discontinuous at the threshold. For example, a large body of theoretical research on insurance presumes
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the negative association between the income and the demand for insurance based on the fact the risk
aversion decreases with the income (e.g., Mossin 1968). However, such assumption often lacks the empirical
support. For example, Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) finds the positive relationship between the income and
the probability of purchasing the insurance, while Browne and Hoyt (2000) reports the opposite effect of
income. Thus, we are agnostic about the directional effect of income but use it as a control for consumer’s
unobserved risk preference. Related to the auto dealers, suppose they know that the purchase rate of
extended warranty decreases discontinuously at the expiry of base warranty. In this case, auto dealers face
strong incentives to cut margins on used vehicles just before base warranty expires and make up the lost
profits by selling extended warranties. If this is the case, the distribution of auto dealer’s profit made on the
sales of the vehicle will not be smooth at the threshold. To test the discontinuity of consumers’ income and
auto dealers’ profit, we run nonparametric RD for these observed covariates against the running variable.
We first visually inspect the distribution of covariates illustrated in Figure 11. Each point is the average
value of the corresponding covariates within the 200-mile bin. From these plots, we do not find any apparent
discontinuity for the consumers’ income and auto dealers’ profit from used vehicle sales at the threshold of
bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty coverages. The RD coefficient of the covariates are given in
Table 6. The estimates of RD coefficient for income and profit are not statistically significant. The test does
not reveal any discontinuity of these covariates at the bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty mileage
marks.
In summary, after careful review of the key threats to identification and employing the necessary safe-
guards, we are sufficiently confident that RD design is valid in our context.
6 Results
To examine the effect of the base warranty on purchasing an extended warranty, we begin by first graphing
the relationship between the mileage of the used vehicle and the probability of buying the extended warranty
at the base-warranty thresholds in Figure 11. Each panel illustrates the average purchase rate for an extended
warranty within 100-mile bin. The vertical line denotes the basic-warranty-cutoff mark. The non-parametric
locally linear fitted lines without any covariates (i.e., without Xdjst) are overlaid in each plot. Figure 11
visually highlights our model-free evidence on discontinuous changes in extended warranty purchase rates at
the expiry of base warranties. As seen in the plots, these do not seem to be any discontinuity in bumper-to-
bumper warranties, however, a discontinuity is very noticeable at powertrain warranty threshold. To more
formally test for the presence of such discontinuities, we pool all observations with common base warranty
cutoffs and estimate a pooled non-parametric RD at each of the bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty
thresholds observed in our data. Herein, we estimate the individual-level choice probability of purchasing
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extended warranties without any covariates. We report our corresponding non-parametric RD treatment
effects in Table 7. Consistent with our RD plot (Figure 11), our non-parametric RD estimates without
any covariates yield statistically insignificant effects for bumper-to-bumper warranty expiry, but significant
estimates for the expiry of powertrain warranty. Note, by pooling data across all vehicles we do not exploit
aforementioned differences across vehicles, which may explain insignificance of our RD treatment effect across
across several thresholds. 25 As shown in Table 7, for vehicles with a base 60k miles of powertrain warranty,
upon the expiry of the vehicle’s powertrain warranty, the odds of purchasing extended warranties drops by 19
percent. This size of the discontinuous drop is pretty similar and persistent across other powertrain warranty
cutoffs.
Next, we conduct parametric and non-parametric RD regressions including vehicle characteristics and
buyer demographics as covariates and assess the stability of our treatment effects across the parametric and
non-parametric approaches. We report our parametric model estimates for the bumper-to-bumper mileage
thresholds in Table 8 and the corresponding non-parametric RD treatment effects in Table 9. First and
foremost, our RD treatment effects for bumper-to-bumper warranty thresholds are qualitatively similar
across our parametric and non-parametric models. Unlike our model without covariates, our model with
covariates yield statistically significant drop in purchase rates for bumper-to-bumper warranties for one of
the four bumper-to-bumper warranty thresholds, namely the 50K bumper-to-bumper warranty threshold.
This bumper-to-bumper warranty threshold applies to several popular economy and luxury brands (see
Table 1). We conduct similar analysis for each of the powertrain cutoffs and report the corresponding
parametric and non-parametric results in Tables 10 and 11 respectively. Consistent with our RD plots, we
obtain statistically significant discontinuous drops in purchase rates of extended warranties at each and every
powertrain warranty expiry threshold (see Table 11).
Taken together, our treatment effects suggest that auto buyers are more likely to purchase extended
warranties shortly before the base warranty on the vehicle expires, than shortly right after. To put these
estimated purchase rates reductions in extended warranties in perspective, in the U.S. automobile market,
the extended-warranty market has been steadily growing at the rate of 2% per year (NADA 2015). In 2014
alone, U.S. auto buyers spent upwards of $14.7 billion on optional extended warranties (Warranty Week
2015). Selling extended warranties has also become an attractive source of profitability for manufacturers
and retailers alike (Abito and Salant 2015). Extant research has shown that contribution margins from
extended warranties are upwards of 50%, which dwarf the profit margins accrued selling the durable good
itself. Given the growth and profitability of the extended warranty in the U.S. automobile market, the 7%
25Going forward we will explicitly account for these difference and even assess if the RD treatment effect varies across vehicles.
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to 10% (67%) percentage point drop in the purchase rate of extended warranty at the expiry of powertrain
warranty (bumper-to-bumper warranty) threshold not only is statistically significant result but also has a
strong economic implication to the auto dealers.
6.1 Heterogeneous Treatment Effect
Earlier in the article, we discussed the insurance and signaling roles of warranties. Recall that each
of these motives has polar-opposite predictions on the demand for extended warranties. According to the
insurance motive, we expect the likelihood of purchasing extended warranties to be higher for the used
vehicles prior to the expiry of the base warranty than post-expiry. In contrast, signaling theory predicts that
buyers perceive used vehicles with residual warranties to be of better quality compared to those without,
and will therefore be less prone to buying the extended warranty on the vehicles that have remaining base
warranties than those that do not. Our findings suggest that the net effect of these two countervailing
motives for powertrain warranties is negative. This implies that in the local region around the expiry of the
powertrain warranty, insurance motives dominate signaling motives.
To further examine the insurance and signaling roles of residual base warranty, we investigate the hetero-
geneity between brands. Assuming that J.D. Power’s quality score is a good predictor of longtime reliability
of the vehicle,then auto buyers who purchase a used vehicle with higher quality score face less product quality
uncertainty than their peers who purchase low-ranked used cars. Given that high-ranked used vehicles has
less risk than low-ranked cars, the role of signaling quality through the residual base warranty is smaller for
high-ranked used cars than low-ranked ones. Hence, upon the expiry of base warranty, we would expect that
the insurance motive of residual base warranty dominates the signaling motive more so for the high-ranked
brands than low-ranked brands. In other words, the RD estimates of the base warranty expiry would be
greater for the used vehicles with low quality score than those ranked high on the quality measure. To test
this hypothesis, we divide all our used vehicles along the quality score. We examine the heterogeneous RD
effects across the quality score and report the results in Table 12. The far-right column examines those
brands with the highest quality score (5) and less uncertainty with the product quality. The brands with
the lowest quality score (2) and more risk to the product are shown at the far-left column. For the used cars
whose the quality score is 2, upon the expiry of powertrain warranty, the marginally statistically significant
RD estimate of 0.183 suggests that the purchase rate of extended warranty increases discontinuously. In
contrast, we find that the purchase rate of extended warranty drops at the threshold of powertrain warranty
expiry for 5-rating used cars. Mean difference in RD estimates between the brands with quality scores of 2
and 5 are statistically significant (t-statistic: 81.87), This provides a suggestive evidence that the presence
of residual base warranty plays a role of signaling motive in the used vehicle market.
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In addition to the quality score, we investigate the heterogeneity across the coverage of base warranty.
The thinking goes as follows. In new vehicle market, the automobile manufacturers set the terms of base
warranty to signal the unobserved product quality. Rational consumers would infer that a vehicle with the
extensive base warranty is of a higher quality than another vehicle with less comprehensive base warranty
because the auto makers with the higher quality would incur lower expected warranty costs, hence, would be
willing to offer an extended base warranty. Suppose the signaling mechanism via the base warranty persists
in the used vehicle market. Then, all else being equal, two used vehicles with the same residual base warranty
(e.g., both cars have 1 year and 10,000 miles left to the expiry) but different original base warranty coverage
would be perceived differently by consumers. That is, consumers perceive less uncertainty to purchase
the used vehicle whose the original base warranty coverage is longer than that with shorter base warranty
although both used vehicles have identical residual base warranty. As the original base warranty eliminates
the uncertainty involved with the used vehicle purchase, the signaling role of residual base warranty will
be smaller for the brands with the more comprehensive original base warranty than other brands with less
extensive original base warranty. Therefore, we expect to see that the RD estimates of the base warranty
expiry would be greater for the used vehicles with shorter original base warranty than those with longer
original base warranty. To examine if that is true, we divide the used vehicles into the terms of their original
base warranty. We examine the heterogeneous RD effects across the base warranty coverage and report the
results in Table 13. The output for the brands whose the bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranties
span over 3-year/36k-mile and 5-year/60k-mile, respectively, are shown at the left column. The right column
includes the RD estimates for the brands in which bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranties are good
until 3-year/36k-mile and 5-year/100k-mile, respectively. As predicted by signaling theory, the purchase rates
of extended warranties drops more precipitously for vehicles with greater base warranties than those with
less comprehensive base warranties. Mean difference in RD estimates between two groups are statistically
significant (t-statistics: 147.57 and 119.54). This provides a compelling evidence that the signaling role of
base warranties is persistent even in the used vehicle market and even after the base warranties expire.
6.2 RD Treatment Effect Away From the Threshold
One limitation of the RD approach is that we can only identify the treatment effect at the cutoff and
within the local region around the cutoff (i.e., within the chosen bandwidth). Although the RD design
provides reliable estimates of the casual effect and affords strong internal validity, it offers little guidance on
how the treatment effect would change if we were to change our treatment assignment rule.
In our empirical setting, our recovered treatment effects only holds at the base warranty cutoffs observed
in our data. In light of recent changes in the provisioning of base warranties enacted by Chrysler and General
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Motors, it would be extremely beneficial to assess what impact these changes will have on the purchase rates
of extended warranties and correspondingly the financial outcomes of the retailer. Since, the revised base
warranty levels are not directly observed in our data, we employ the new technique developed by Angrist and
Rokkanen (2015) that allows us to generalize the RD estimate and treatment effect in the regions proximate
to cutoffs observed in our data.
The method relies on identifying a set of control variables that constitute a sufficient statistic for the
running variable in a window wider than the optimal bandwidth used in the RD estimator - the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) whereby once we condition on the set of control variables, the potential
outcomes are mean-independent of the running variable. In other words, by conditioning on the observable
covariates except the running variable we eliminate the relationship between the running variable and out-
comes. This allows us to assess counterfactual scenarios akin to the ones enacted by General Motors and
Chrysler, i.e., what would have happened to the (un)treated observations in the (presence) absence of the
treatment. To find such good controls it is not always feasible but Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) advance an
elegant approach to isolate promising candidates. Below we provide a brief overview of this approach.
The outcome, Yj is the logit transformation of conditional probability of buying an extended warranty for
used vehicle j. Let Vj be the running variable, the odometer mileage of the vehicle. The treatment variable
of interest is Dj = 1 {Vj > 0}, an indicator of the expiry of base warranty for vehicle j. Accordingly, Yj (Dj)
are the two potential outcomes of interest that capture the purchase rate of extended warranty if the vehicle’s
base warranty becomes expired or not. The average difference between these two potential outcomes is the
expiry effect.
Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) point out that Dj is a deterministic function of the running variable and,
therefore, in comparing treated and control units, Vj is the only omitted variable. That is, if the running
variable in RD is randomly assigned at the threshold, then the treatment is also randomly assigned, then and
we could analyze it as an experiment without worrying about the discontinuity threshold or about modeling
the running variable.
As is well known, the usual RD only identifies the effect of interest at the threshold where, in the limit,
the treated and control units have the same value of the running variable. Away from the threshold there is
no overlap in the running variable, as all used vehicles with Vj > 0 are treated with an expired base warranty
and all used vehicles with Vj<0 are not treated.
To get away from the discontinuity threshold, Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) propose gathering a set of
control variables, Xj , and imposing a CIA, which asserts that
E [Yj (Dj) |Vj , Xj ] = E [Yj (Dj) |Xj ]
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for Dj ∈ {0, 1}. This says that once we condition on the set of covariates in Xj , the potential outcomes
are mean-independent of the running variable Vj . In other words, by controlling for the set of observed
covariates we break the correlation between the running variable and the potential outcomes, ensuring
that we can identify the missing counterfactual average of what would have happened to the treated units
in the absence of the treatment. In particular, if CIA holds, then in this conditioning set we have that
(Yj (1) , Yj (0) ⊥ Vj |Xj) and, given common support, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is
therefore identified by a covariate adjusted comparison of the observed outcomes for treated and control
units, as in
τATT = E [Yj (1)− Yj (0) |Dj = 1]
=
∫
(E [Yj (1) |Dj = 1, Xj ]− E [Yj (0) |Dj = 0, Xj ]) dP (X|Dj = 1)
It is not always possible to find such good controls but Angrist and Rokkanen (2015) show a straight-
forward statistical test that isolates promising candidates. Consider the used vehicles post-expiry of base
warranty. The CIA implies that
E [Yj (1) |V j,Xj , Dj = 1] = E [Yj (1) |Xj ]
= E [Yj (1) |Xj , Dj = 1]
which means that we should see that
E [Yj |V j,Xj , Dj = 1] = E [Yj |Xj , Dj = 1]
if the proposed conditioning set Xj makes the CIA valid. By the same logic, for the used vehicles
pre-expiry of base warranty we should see
E [Yj |V j,Xj , Dj = 0] = E [Yj |Xj , Dj = 0]
In practice, we can test for CIA by estimating OLS equations of the form
Yj = β0 + β1Vj +Xj + εj
on each side of the threshold in separate regressions and test for β1 = 0. The intuition of the tests is as
follows. The RD tells us that Vj is the only omitted variable. If the control set successfully addresses the
omitted variable bias, then when the covariates and Vj are included in the same regression on each side of
the discontinuity, there should be no remaining correlation between Vj and the outcome variable. If we find
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that there is no remaining correlation then we have reason to believe we can compare treated and control
units with like values of Xj even though they have different values of the running variable. This allows us
to move away from the threshold even though by definition no treated and control units have overlapping
values of the running variable.
The regressions used to test the CIA include the odometer mileage of the vehicle, consumer’s age and
income, auto dealer’s profit from used vehicle sales, transacted price of the vehicle, quality score, indicators
of co-buyer and trade-in the make-model same as the purchase vehicle, and fixed effects of make, model, year,
and month. CIA test results, reported in Table 14, show β1 estimates for windows defined to the left and
right of the threshold from 15k miles to 25k miles. For example, in Panel A, to the left of bumper-to-bumper
warranty threshold (D=0), the 20k-mile window contains the used vehicles in which the odometer mileage
is between 16k miles and 36k miles. To the right of the threshold of bumper-to-bumper warranty (D=1),
this contains the used vehicles whose odometer mileage is between 36k miles and 56k miles. For brands
whose bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty coverage lasts until 3-year/36k-mile and 5-year/60-k
mile, respectively, we find that the β1 estimates are statistically insignificant for 25k-mile windows (Panel
A). Moreover, CIA is valid at 20k-mile and 25k-mile windows around the bumper-to-bumper threshold
for brand in which bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty coverage lasts until 3-year/36k-mile and
5-year/100-k mile, respectively. For these brands, β1 estimates are statistically insignificant for 15k-mile
window around the powertrain threshold (Panel B).
Test result for CIA identifies the windows that CIA is valid. For each of these windows, we compute
the expiry effect of base warranty on the purchase rate of extended warranty. Table 15 displays the results.
We find that for the brand with bumper-to-bumper of 3-year/36k-mile and powertrain of 5-year/60k-mile,
the purchase rate of extended warranty discontinuously jumps upon the expiry of bumper-to-bumper war-
ranty by 12.8 percent and drop by 19 percent upon the expiry of powertrain warranty. Also, the expiry of
bumper-to-bumper and powertrain warranty leads to 14.8 and 33.9 percents decrease in the purchase rate of
extended warranty for brands whose bumper-to-bumper and powertrain coverages are 3-year/36k-mile and
5-year/100k-mile, respectively. These CIA estimates are remarkably consistent with the corresponding RD
estimates at the threshold. The way to interpret this CIA-based estimate is the following: by expanding
their bumper-to-bumper warranty coverage by 20K miles, vehicles that are currently out of the bumper-
to-bumper warranty would now suddenly receive additional residual warranty. Increased residual warranty
would allow the retailer to sell even fewer extended warranties to otherwise interested auto buyers (who were
previously deliberating this choice for vehicles with expired bumper-to-bumper warranty). However, when
these enhanced bumper-to-bumper warranties expire, these retailers will see an even larger uptake in ex-
tended warranties from auto buyers already interested in purchasing extended warranties. These effects are
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reversed should these manufacturers decide to expand their powertrain warranties. Expanding powertrain
warranties results in increasing the room for the retailer to sell more extended warranties (over more miles
pre-expiry), but these enhanced powertrain warranties expire, the reduction in purchase rates of extended
warranties in much more precipitous for retailers selling vehicles with more expansive powertrain warranties
to begin with. Hence the upstream implications of warranty provisioning can have very important and
heterogeneous impact on retailers financial outcomes.
Changes to manufacturer base warranties can also directly impact premiums that dealers levy on extended
warranties and perhaps also profits the dealer realizes from sale of the vehicle itself. In order to conduct some
back of the envelope calculations, we estimated a series of hedonic regressions. Specifically, we ran hedonic
regressions for extended warranty premiums, extended warranty profits, vehicle sales prices and profits from
vehicle sales. We included the full set of previously included covariates. We report the coefficients for the
respective hedonic regressions in Table 15. For example, when manufacturers expand bumper-to-bumper
warranty coverage by one percent, their actions depress extended warranty premiums and profits by seven
percent and three percent respectively. However, dealers are able to trade this off by realizing higher
transacted prices and profits from the sale of the vehicle itself. By reducing powertrain warranties, as is done
by Chrysler and General Motors, the auto makers helped the retailer sell more extended warranties to buyers
of their used vehicles, however, it also comes at the expense of realizing smaller margins from selling the
vehicle. We report the net impact on dealer profits and revenues in Table 16. The gains are higher (lower)
for auto makers with more (less) expansive base warranties. Amongst auto buyers, older buyer more so than
younger auto buyers are (more/less) likely to purchase extended warranties when auto makers claw back
their base warranties.
6.3 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
In this section, we address a number of alternative explanations and factors that might affect our findings.
Placebo Test. Do discontinuities occur at mileage marks other than the vehicle’s basic and power-train-
warranty marks? Evidence of such discontinuities can call into question the causal mechanism we posit. To
rule out this legitimate concern, we perform the aforementioned local linear regression for every 10,000-mile
threshold. Nine out of ten times, we do not find any discontinuity in the demand for extended warranties
around the local region of the cutoffs. The only exception is the 40,000-mile marker, where we find significant
discontinuity. However, this is not surprising, since 93.2% of the bandwidth around the 40,000-mile mark
overlaps with the expiry of the basic warranty at the 36,000-mile mark. The bandwidth and results are
shown in the Online Appendix Tables 18 and 19.
Product Availability. Another concern is that the expiry of the base warranty can be confounded with
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the product availability. This could manifest in two ways. First, reduced availability very likely increases the
transacted price of the used vehicle. Higher transaction prices, in turn, will lead consumers to protect their
vehicles (consistent with insurance motivations) and result in higher purchase rates of extended warranties.
Second, in the market where auto dealers maintain a low inventory level or offer a narrow range of products,
consumers can purchase extended warranties in lieu of limited access to aftermarket parts and more expensive
repairs, should the vehicle parts need replacements. If this is the case, product availability can be a source
of unobserved heterogeneity around the warranty thresholds and be correlated with the recovered treatment
effect. To address this concern, we create a measure of product availability by counting the number of similar
vehicles (i.e., of the same make-model as the focal vehicle) offered by the same auto dealer in the particular
year-month when the focal vehicle was sold. Then we perform a battery of tests. First, the McCrary test
is conducted to check if product availability exhibits discontinuity before and after the warranty marks.
The Online Appendix Table 20 shows that the McCrary test rejects the null hypothesis, which implies that
there is no systematic difference between the densities of product availability measures pre- and post-expiry
of basic/power-train-warranty thresholds. Second, we run a local linear regression that directly allows the
product availability to impact extended-warranty-purchase rates. As seen in the Online Appendix Table
21, this analysis also yields statistically insignificant estimates of product availability, which further allays
treatment-effect bias that might stem fro-m product availability.
Endogenous Choice of Extended-Warranty Terms. Consumers pre- and post-expiry of basic/power-train-
warranty marks may choose the different terms of extended warranties. If consumers to the left of the
cutoff systematically purchase the shorter period of extended warranties than those to the right, or vice
versa, it can be evidence of self-sorting due to their risk preferences. Under the assumption that extended-
warranty premiums reflect the terms of warranties, we estimate an non-parametric RD on the extended-
warranty prices. As can be seen in the Online Appendix Table 22, the extended-warranty price does not
show any discontinuity pattern at the 36,000-mile or the 60,000-mile marks, where we obtain significant RD
estimates on the purchase rates for extended warranties. At the 100,000-mile mark, we find a significant
negative RD estimate of the extended-warranty premium, meaning that consumers tend to buy cheaper or
less comprehensive extended-warranty products post-expiry of the power-train warranty. Since our main
findings rest on the basic warranty mark of 36,000-miles and the power-train warranty of 60,000-miles, our
treatment-effect estimates are also robust to the concern of endogenous choice of extended-warranty terms.
7 Conclusion
Thus far, we have studied the interaction between manufacturer-backed factory warranties (that come
bundled with the product at no additional cost) and optional extended warranties (that need to be purchased
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separately) in the used-vehicle market. We employ an RD design and show how the demand for extended
warranties drops/increases as the manufacturer-backed basic/power-train warranty expires. Once recover
our causal treatment effect estimates, we employ the potential outcomes framework extended by Angrist
and Rokkanen (2015) to explore the impact of recent sweeping changes in manufacturer warranties enacted
by General Motors and Chrysler on some key revenue and profit streams for the downstream auto dealer.
We show that if these auto makers were to only reduce provisioning of bumper-to-bumper warranties, then
vehicles with lower status-quo bumper-to-bumper warranties will experience a 12% increase in the sales
of extended warranties while vehicles with more expansive status-quo bumper-to-bumper warranties will
experience a 15% reduction in sales of extended warranties. On the other hand, if auto makers were to only
reduce provisioning of powertrain warranties, then all vehicles irrespective of their status-quo base warranty
levels, will experience a very sizable drop in sales of extended warranties. Specifically, for vehicles with lower
(higher) status-quo powertrain warranties retailers could face a 19% (34%) reduction in the purchase rates of
extended warranties. Manufacturer-induced reductions in base warranties also erode both the premiums and
profits dealers realize from selling extended warranties by 7% and 3% respectively. Last but not the least,
such manufacturer-induced reductions in base warranties also erode the transacted prices on the vehicles
sold and the profits dealers realize from selling vehicles alone.
Although this study makes several contributions to the empirical literature on product warranties, it has
some limitations. First, we limit our analysis to used vehicles alone in part because new vehicles have limited
variation in residual base warranties. Hence, we cannot readily make any statements about the window of
opportunity that auto dealers have to sell extended warranties to buyers of new vehicles. A few niche auto
makers’ vehicles were intentionally left out of our analysis. These were excluded in part because they had
very different base-warranty mileage cutoffs than those we have currently included in the analysis. However,
the empirical framework we advance in this study can be readily extended to quantify the sales-opportunity
window for these vehicles and assess how it varies relative to the ones we currently include in the study. We
hope this study and its findings help garner greater interest amongst marketing scholars to advance more
research in the area of product warranties and assess if the economic benefits these products accrue justify
the premiums consumers pay to protect themselves from modest levels of product failure.
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Audi Audi 4/50,000 4/50,000
Bentley Bentley 3/Unlimited 3/Unlimited




Ferrari Ferrari 2/Unlimited 2/Unlimited
Ford













Hyundai Hyundai, Kia 5/60,000 10/100,000
Jaguar Jaguar 4/50,000 4/50,000
Lamborghini Lamborghini 3/Unlimited 3/Unlimited
Land Rover Land Rover 4/50,000 4/50,000
Lotus Lotus 3/36,000 3/36,000
Maserati Maserati 4/50,000 4/50,000
Maybach Maybach 4/50,000 4/50,000
Mazda Mazda 3/36,000 5/60,000
Mercedes-Benz Mercedes-Benz 4/50,000 4/50,000




Porsche Porsche 4/50,000 4/50,000
Rolls-Royce Rolls-Royce 4/Unlimited 4/Unlimited
Subaru Subaru 3/36,000 5/60,000
Suzuki Suzuki 3/36,000 7/100,000
Toyota
Toyota, Scion 3/36,000 5/60,000
Lexus 4/50,000 6/70,000
Volkswagen Volkswagen 3/36,000 5/60,000
31
Table 2: Select Extended Warranties (years/miles)









General Motors Ally Financial Inc.
Basic Guard not specified 6
Value Guard not specified 11









Total Confidence not specified 13
Nissan Nissan
Powertrain Plan 7/100,000 3
Deluxe Plan 7/100,000 9









































Table 3: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
EW Purchase Rate 0.479 0.500 0 1
Age 43.35 14.11 20 80
Income 59,670 23,902.38 1,799 191,400
Co Buyer 0.329 0.470 0 1
Trade-In Make-Model 0.056 0.231 0 1
Profit from Vehicle Sales 2,373 4,159.931 -17,680 39,000
Transacted Price of Vehicle 19,690 6,671.83 1,000 48,000
Quality Score 3.501 0.982 2 5
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Observations 4,025 3,476 4,927
Mean of Purchase Rate of
Extended Warranty
0.533 0.543 0.539
Bandwidth [-9500, 9500] [-8,000, 8,000] [-8,000, 8,000]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Observations 1,887 1,731 2,127
Mean of Purchase Rate of
Extended Warranty
0.519 0.522 0.52
Bandwidth [-10900, 10900] [-9,000, 9,000] [-12,000, 12,000]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Bandwidth [-9500, 9500] [-10900, 10900]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Nonparametric RD Results at Bumper-to-Bumper Threshold Without Covariates














Bandwidth [-9500, 9500] [-8,000, 8,000] [-12,000, 12,000]














Bandwidth [-10900, 10900] [-9,000, 9,000] [-12,000, 12,000]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: Parametric RD Results at Bumper-to-Bumper Thresholds Without Covariates





















































































Quality Score Yes Yes Yes Yes
Make Dummy Yes No No Yes
Model Dummy Yes No No Yes
Year Dummy Yes No No Yes
Month Dummy Yes No No Yes
Dealership
Dummy
Yes No No Yes




[-8100, 8100] [-9500, 9500]
[-11000,
11000]
Observations 4731 103 1517 6351
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9: Nonparametric RD Results at Bumper-to-Bumper Threshold with Covariates









Observations 4731 103 1517 6351
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Make Dummy Yes No Yes
Model Dummy No No No
Year Dummy Yes No Yes
Month Dummy Yes No Yes
Dealership Dummy Yes No Yes
AIC 2107.143 625.08 3534.016
Bandwidth [-8000, 8000] [-13000, 13000] [-11000, 11000]
Observations 1567 497 2674
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Observations 1567 497 2674
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12: RD Estimates Across Quality Score
Quality Score 2 3 4 5




















5300 12300 7600 12500























22000 11000 13400 21000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
43
Table 14: Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) Tests
A. (3-year/36k-miles; 5-year/60k-mile)
Bumper-to-Bumper Powertrain





























































No. Obs. 976 1267 479 177
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Bandwidth [-25000, 25000] [-15000, 15000]
Observations 2243 345

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-83 (18.9%) -96459.2 (-18.4%) -129001.1 (-18.7%)
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Table 18: Robustness Check: Placebo Test Results (Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty)























































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 19: Robustness Check: Placebo Test Results (Power-train Warranty)





































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Observations 5,848 3,310 938
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Intercept -.741 (.854) -2.854** (1.130) -1.626 (1.502)




-.036** (.018) -.03* (.016) .0067 (.014)
Vehicle Mileage
(000s)
.023* (.013) .015 (.013) -.008 (.011)
Product Availability -.000032 (.0006) .000049 (.0011) .0097 (.016)
Cash Price (000s) .051*** (.008) .075*** (.014) .031 (.02)
Trade-In Value
(000s)
-.0056 (.0054) .0018 (.016)
Make Dummy yes yes yes
Model Dummy yes yes yes
Dealer Dummy yes yes yes
State Dummy yes yes yes
Year Dummy yes yes yes
Month Dummy yes yes yes
AIC 6870.8 2584.4 1190
Observations 5263 1819 937
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Vehicle Mileage -6.875 (62.053) 12.204 (100.85) -440.23** (205.19)
Observations 5340 2917 1613
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON DEMAND FOR EXTENDED WARRANTY
1 Introduction
Durable goods represent a large fraction of the goods produced and purchased (Waldman 2003), and
often come bundled with free manufacturer-backed warranties (Lutz and Padmanabhan 1995). These
manufacturer-backed warranties (or base warranties) insure consumers from the risk of product failure for
a limited time post purchase of the product (Heal 1977; Spence 1977). Consumers often rely on these
manufacturer-backed warranties to infer product quality when making their purchase decisions (Grossman
1981; Bearden and Shimp 1982; Padmanabhan and Rao 1993). Furthermore, if durable-goods buyers exhibit
a heterogeneous preference for risk aversion, then manufacturers can offer a menu of products with different
base warranties as a credible way to screen consumers and realize greater gains from price discrimination
(Kubo 1986; Lutz and Padmanabhan 1998; Padmanabhan and Rao 1993; Padmanabhan 1995). Not surpris-
ingly, manufacturer-backed warranties have become an important element of durable-goods manufacturers’
marketing mix and are increasingly being highlighted in consumer-directed promotional materials (Desai
and Padmanabhan 2004; Soberman 2003).26
Consumers also have the option to purchase extended warranties at an additional cost (often in the
form of a one-time payment). Extended warranties, as their name suggests, extend the duration of the
manufacturer-backed warranty coverage (Chu and Chintagunta 2011; Jiang and Zhang 2011). In the U.S.,
the extended-warranty market has been steadily growing at the rate of 7% per year (Jindal 2015). In
2014 alone, U.S. consumers spent upwards of $38 billion on optional extended warranties (Warranty Week
26On January 4, 1975, President Ford signed into law the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Title 1, 101-112, 15 U.S.C. 2301 et
seq. The Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act mandates that manufacturers of consumer products (costing more than $15)
must provide consumers with detailed information about warranty coverage on a product before they purchase the product
so as to ”improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the
marketing of consumer products.” The writing must state the warranty in readily understandable language as determined by
standards set forth by the Federal Trade Commission. This Act, however, does not require manufacturers to offer a warranty
or mandate that any product be warrantied for a certain length of time. Thus the Act only requires that when there is a
written warranty, the warrantor must clearly disclose the nature of his warranty obligation prior to the sale of the product.
The consumer may then compare warranty protection, thus shopping for the ”best buy.” Another important provision of the
Act prohibits a warrantor from disclaiming or modifying any implied warranty whenever any written warranty is given or
service contract entered into.
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2015), which makes this market even larger than the total online advertising spend across all firms spanning
all industries in the United States. Selling extended warranties has also become an attractive source of
profitability for manufacturers and retailers alike (Abito and Salant 2015).27 Extant research has shown
that contribution margins from extended warranties are upwards of 50%, which dwarf the profit margins
accrued selling the durable good itself. Not surprisingly, manufacturers and retailers are marketing extended
warranties to buyers more aggressively than ever before, a practice that is increasingly receiving a lot of
public scrutiny and attention from regulators. 28
Despite a rich body of theoretical literature in marketing and economics, surprisingly, scant empirical
research exists on the market for warranties (base or extended). Day and Fox (1985) were the first to empir-
ically investigate correlations between consumers’ attitudes towards extended warranties and demographics,
but they did not estimate a demand model for extended warranties. Padmanabhan and Rao (1993), Padman-
abhan (1995), and Soberman (2003) provide theory-driven justification to explain the provisioning of limited
manufacturer-backed warranties in the presence of extended warranties, but do not estimate a demand model
for extended warranties.
To the best of our knowledge, only four studies have formally estimated a demand model for warranties
(base or extended). Chu and Chintagunta (2009) propose and estimate a demand model to quantify the
economic value of base warranties to channel intermediaries, but do not advance a demand model for extended
warranties. In contrast, Chen, Kalra, and Sun (2009), Jindal (2015), and Abito and Salant (2015) calibrate
demand models for extended warranties, but do not explicitly consider manufacturer-backed warranties. To
the best of our knowledge, no study to date has estimated an integrated demand model taking into account
both manufacturer-backed warranties and extended warranties. Therefore, Chu and Chintagunta’s (2011)
call for research into the important question of “how base warranties and extended warranties interact with
each other and how manufacturers assign their resources across these two markets” continues to remain
unanswered.
This study is substantively and methodologically different from these four empirical studies on product
warranties in several distinct ways. First, the aforementioned empirical studies focus exclusively on base
or extended warranties. In contrast, we investigate the role of both base and extended warranties within
one unified structural econometric demand model. In doing so, we directly address the gap in the empirical
literature on warranties identified by Chu and Chintagunta (2011). Second, Desai and Padmanabhan (2004),
27It has been widely reported that almost half of Best Buy’s operating profits come from extended warranties.
28Extended warranties are often marketed as an add-on product after consumers finalize their decision to purchase the durable
good. Since at this stage, it is very costly for consumers to revisit their purchase decision of the main product, and since
retailers rarely advertise the prices of their extended-warranty offering, retailers are afforded significant pricing power. This
“complex monopoly situation” is increasingly coming under investigation and regulatory oversight (Baker and Siegelman
2013).
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Padmanabhan (1995), and Soberman (2003) identify theory-driven conditions to justify when it is optimal
for firms to provide a menu of warranty contracts, but offer limited guidance on how to optimally design a
menu of extended-warranty contracts. In contrast, this study structurally models the demand for a menu of
extended-warranty contracts (namely, Regular and Comprehensive), which can be leveraged by the warranty
underwriter to design an optimal extended-warranty menu. Specifically, we use our model to investigate how
the demand for each extended-warranty menu option changes in response to the underwriter repricing an
extended-warranty menu option or the durable-good manufacturer changing the terms of the manufacturer-
backed warranties that come bundled with its durable good.29
Last, but not the least, because past research has focused exclusively on base or extended warranties,
extant research offers limited insight on how durable-goods buyers trade off manufacturer-backed warranties
and extended warranties. Do these consumers treat these two warranties as substitutes or complements? How
might changing the terms of the manufacturer-backed warranties impact the demand for extended warranties?
Correspondingly, how does changing the terms of the manufacturer-backed warranties impact the demand for
the various extended-warranty menu options?
How consumers trade off manufacturer-backed warranties and extended warranties is both manageri-
ally pertinent and very timely in the context of the U.S. automobile industry. In March 2015, the five-
year/100,000-mile powertrain coverage -- once touted by former GM CEO Rick Wagoner as a symbol of the
improved quality of GM’s vehicles -- was drastically reduced to a five-year/60,000-mile warranty for all Gen-
eral Motors flagship brands.30 The reason provided by Steve Hill, GM North America vice president, for this
change was that “Free scheduled maintenance and warranty coverage do not rank high as a reason to purchase
a vehicle among buyers of non-luxury brands.” (Source: USA Today 2015). GM’s policy change shocked most
industry insiders because only a few years earlier in 2007, General Motors had expanded its manufacturer-
backed warranty so as to remain competitive with its industry peers. Shortly after the GM announcement,
in late March 2015, Chrysler, too, also enacted similar reductions in the manufacturer-backed warranties on
key brands in its product portfolio. In contrast, Tesla Motors increased its manufacturer-backed warranties.
As automakers enacted these changes to their manufacturer-backed warranties, GM and Chrysler dealerships
saw this as a welcome opportunity to sell more extended warranties. For example, David Ferraez, who owns
a string of Buick-GMC and Chevrolet dealerships in northern New Jersey, said: “Selfishly for me, the first
thing I thought of was that it will probably help me to sell more extended warranties. We’ll be able to make
more money doing that instead of the factory.” (Source: Endurance Warranty). Such statements suggest
29While past empirical research has exclusively investigated the role of warranties in the context of the purchase of new durable
goods, this study explores the role of both types of warranties for both new and used durable goods.
30A GM spokesman said “The financial impact of this change is immaterial and any savings will be reinvested in features
customers value like advanced vehicle technology.”
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that industry insiders believe that auto buyers will substitute reduced manufacturer-backed warranties with
supplemental optional extended warranties, i.e., auto buyers treat these two warranties as substitutes.
However, if consumers endogenously sort themselves into vehicles based on their own risk preference, then
highly risk-averse consumers who would have otherwise purchased GM vehicles because of their generous
manufacturer-backed warranties will now switch to other GM brands that continue to maintain high levels
of manufacturer-backed warranties, or switch to brands from other auto makers. Had GM not changed its
manufacturer-backed warranties, these very consumers, because they are highly risk-averse, would be more
likely to purchase GM vehicles; and because they are highly risk-averse, they are also more likely to purchase
extended warranties to insure themselves against any economic loss after the manufacturer warranty expires.
That is, auto buyers treat these two warranties as complements. The distribution of consumers risk prefer-
ences will determine which consumers remain after the reduction in the manufacturer-backed warranties. As
more risk-averse consumers switch to other vehicles, the less risk-averse consumers will continue to purchase
the product with a much-reduced manufacturer-backed warranty. As the consumers who remain have a
lower risk preference, they will also be less likely to purchase extended warranties. Therefore, reductions to
manufacturer-backed warranties can engineer reductions to both the demand for the auto maker’s vehicles
and also the demand for the extended warranties purchased to insure these vehicles. Understanding and
quantifying these countervailing mechanisms is critical to evaluating the short-run implications of the policy
changes to manufacturer-backed warranties on the demand for extended warranties. Unlike past research,
this is the central research objective of our study and the third main contribution of our study.
This paper is related to two literatures that cut across marketing and economics. The first estimates risk
preferences from observed choices. The majority of the studies in this literature rely on data from surveys
(e.g., Viscusi and Evans 1990; Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro 2008, 2009), laboratory or field experiments (e.g.,
Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992; Holt and Laury 2002; Choi et al. 2007; Jindal 2015), or natural experiments
in non-market settings (Blavatskyy and Pogrebna 2008; Jullien and Salanié 2000). Only a handful of papers
utilize data on risky choices by market participants (Saha 1997; Chetty 2006). More recently, a small group
of scholars has used data on insurance choices to quantify risk preferences (Cicchetti and Dubin 1994; Cohen
and Einav 2007; Einav, Finkelstein and Levin 2010; Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue and Teitelbaum
2015; Sydnor 2010).
This study builds on and contributes to this first literature stream in the following ways. We develop
a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on auto buyers’ extended-warranty
choices (both whether to buy an extended warranty, and which extended warranty to purchase). Like other
insurance products, here, too, two important sources of variation drive the demand for extended warranties,
namely risk preferences (e.g., degree of risk aversion) and variation in risk types (e.g., probability of making
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a claim). Clean delineation of the two drivers is econometrically challenging, and yet crucial for us to make
any normative predictions from our analysis (Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen 2010; Chetty and Finkelstein
2013). Our econometric approach builds on the econometric framework of Cohen and Einav (2007) by
allowing observed and unobserved heterogeneity in both preferences and in risk types. Since Cohen and
Einav (2007) investigate an insurance market where the purchase of the insurance is mandatory, their model
does not accommodate a no-purchase option. However, in our empirical setting, i.e., extended warranties, the
purchase of this insurance product is optional. Therefore, we extend the Cohen and Einav (2007) approach
to also accommodate the no-purchase option within one unified framework.
The key assumptions of our modeling approach are that auto buyers are expected-utility maximizers.
Their choices of whether to buy or not buy extended warranties, and which extended warranty to purchase,
are a function of two utility parameters: (a) their coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and (b) their claim
rate. We impose very limited structure on a household’s utility function, assuming only that it is smooth,
monotone, and state-independent and has a negligible third derivative. We also assume that before making
their extended-warranty choice, consumers form expectations about their future repair costs and are not
perfectly informed about their realized individual-specific claim amounts. We assume that there is no moral
hazard and advance credible model-free evidence to support this assumption.
The second strand of related literature is the recent empirical literature on adverse selection. Much of this
literature uses reduced-form specifications to test the important question of whether adverse selection exists
in different markets (Chiappori and Salanie 2000; Finkelstein and Poterba 2004; Finkelstein and McGarry
2006). Our main goal is quite different. We take a more structural approach, and structurally incorporate
adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (repair claim rate) and risk aversion
and allow flexible correlation in the data-generating process between risk aversion and claim risk. Our
limited structure allows us to estimate the importance of adverse selection relative to the selection induced
by unobserved heterogeneity in risk preference.
Under the assumptions of the model, we derive an expression for the degree of absolute risk aversion at
which a household is indifferent between the various extended warranty menu options, including not buying
any extended warranty. This indifference point is a function of the expected reductions in out-of-pocket
savings and total repair costs across the various extended warranty options, the corresponding differences in
extended warranty premiums, and the individual’s claim rate. We observe all of the variables necessary to
calculate an individual’s indifference points except for their claim rate. We assume that the repair claims
are generated by a Poisson process, and that individuals have perfect information about their Poisson claim
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rates and use these claim rates in their expected utility calculus. 31
The key intuition for our identification strategy is grounded in the fact that an individual’s observed
extended-warranty choice is informative regarding that individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Take,
for example, an individual who has a choice of either not purchasing any extended-warranty, or purchasing
a Regular extended-warranty or a Comprehensive extended-warranty plan. If that individual purchases
a Regular extended-warranty plan, that implies that the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion
lies between two indifference points. The indifference point between not purchasing any extended-warranty
and purchasing the Regular extended-warranty plan provides a lower bound on this individual’s coefficient of
absolute risk aversion. In this fashion, the indifference point between selecting the Regular extended-warranty
versus the Comprehensive extended-warranty provides an upper bound for the same individual’s coefficient
of absolute risk aversion. Therefore, variation in the extended-warranty choice offerings and the individual
auto buyers’ choice from these extended-warranty choice offerings is used to estimate the distribution of
risk aversion in the sample and the correlation between risk aversion and claim risk. Thus, we can estimate
heterogeneous risk preferences from the auto buyers’ extended-warranty choices, while accounting for adverse
selection (unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk).
We find that risk-averse buyers endogenously self-select into vehicles with greater manufacturer-backed
factory warranties, and because they are risk-averse, they are also more likely to purchase extended war-
ranties. Additionally, the most risk-averse consumers purchase vehicles with the most expansive factory
warranties, and they are also the most likely to purchase the most expansive extended-warranty coverage.
Therefore, in our empirical setting, risk-averse consumers’ treat manufacturer-backed factory warranties and
extended warranties as complements rather than substitutes, which, as we illustrate through our counter-
factuals, has significant implications for automakers and extended-warranty underwriters. Specifically, we
use the model estimates to quantify the impact of changes to coverage terms of the manufacturer-backed
warranties (akin to what General Motors, Chrysler and Tesla have enacted) on the demand for extended
warranties. Our results suggest that by increasing the bumper-to-bumper warranty by 5,000 miles, the un-
derwriter can realize $933,970 incremental revenues. Our results provide a lower bound on the potential
revenue gain generated by the automaker (who underwrites both the manufacturer-backed warranty as well
as the extended warranty). We also find that heterogeneity in risk preferences in our empirical setting is
rather large and skewed, and illustrate the direct implications that this has for pricing extended-warranty
contracts. Specifically, we assess how repricing select extended-warranty menu items impacts the demand for
31This allows us to use the observed data on (ex-post) realized claims to estimate the distribution of (ex-ante) claim rates. One
can relax this assumption and accommodate subjective beliefs about product failure (see Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue
and Teitelbaum 2015; Jindal 2015). However, this would require panel data, which we do not currently have. Hence, we
reserve this as a valuable direction for future research.
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extended-warranty in total, as well as the demand for individual extended-warranty menu items. We identify
opportunities for the the extended-warranty underwriter to exercise additional pricing power. For example,
we show that increasing the price of the Regular extended-warranty by 20% maximizes the revenues realized
by the extended-warranty underwriter.32 Substantively, our findings offer rich new insights for underwriters
of manufacturer-backed warranties and the extended warranties in the automobile industry, which is a key
pillar of the U.S. economy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a succinct review of the related
literature on warranties. Section 3 describes our institutional setting and data. Section 4 describes our
structural model. Section 5 lays out our empirical strategy and describes our key results. In Section 6, we
perform our counterfactual analysis as a way to illustrate the implications of our empirical findings for the
automaker and the extended-warranty underwriter. Section 7 concludes with directions for future research.
2 Related Literature
Scholarly inquiry on the provisioning of warranties is very rich in theory. The theoretical underpinnings
can be broadly classified into distinct, yet related, research streams that differ primarily on the economic
role played by warranties (Chu and Chintagunta 2011). One stream of research treats warranties as a form
of insurance. Under the assumption that consumers are risk-averse and firms are risk-neutral, warranties
operate as a risk-sharing mechanism, where risk stems from uncertainty about product quality (Heal 1977). In
settings where consumers are risk-neutral or risk-loving, they do not need any warranty protection because
they willingly bear all the risk. However, as long as the consumers are risk-averse, warranties serve as
an insurance against product failure under pre-determined conditions (Kelley and Conant 1991). Herein,
warranties serve like insurance in that buyers can be induced to purchase goods that have a non-zero
probability of failure, with an assurance from the seller that the buyer will repair or replace the faulty
item on the agreed-upon terms. Sellers offer the warranty to mitigate buyers’ risk and protect them either
fully/partially against product failure.
The second stream of theory treats warranties as a credible source of information flow between buyers
and sellers. Here, firms (both manufacturers and retailers) use warranties as a way to credibly signal
information about product quality. The key assumption of signaling theory is that consumers know the
average quality of all firms, but cannot assess the quality of an individual offer (also known as information
asymmetry). It is also assumed that the quality level is exogenously given to the firm. Akerlof (1970) shows
32Since allowances for warranty repairs from the manufacturer to the dealer and marginal costs for the warranty underwriter
are unobserved in our data, we limit our normative claims from repricing to maximizing revenues only for the auto retailer.
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that information asymmetry can easily lead to market failures. 33 In a market where consumers do not
know the true quality of a product, consumers rely on various other cues to infer product quality (Olson
1973). Sellers, in turn, try to solve the adverse-selection problem by allocating a considerable amount of
resources to transmit information via various actions such as advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981; Milgrom
and Roberts 1986; Schmalensee 1978), price (Srinivasan 1991; Bagwell and Riordan 1986), warranty provision
(Balachander 2001; Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Chu and Chintagunta 2011; Cooper and Ross 1985; Etzion
and Pe’er 2014; Grossman 1981; Lutz 1989; Soberman 2003; Spence 1977), certification to environmental
standards (King et al. 2005), and disclosure about a company’s financial performance (Bhattacharya 1979;
Leland and Pyle 1977; Myers and Majluf 1984). The importance of facilitating information flows in markets
with asymmetric information has been the bedrock of much of the theory development in economics in the
past few decades. Spence (1973) was the first to theorize that the signaling mechanism could be used to
realize information flow credibly amongst market agents. Herein, consumers treat the provisioning of a
warranty as a credible indicator of product quality (Murthy and Blischke 2006). The seminal Spence (1977)
study explores the quality signaling of price and warranties when the quality of the product is not readily
observable to consumers. In equilibrium, the quality can be credibly signaled and suitably inferred from
warranties under two conditions: i) the provision of warranties is costly to the seller, and ii) the production
cost rises with product reliability. Grossman (1981) shows that when the quality of the product is ex-post
verifiable, high-quality sellers can distinguish themselves from low-quality sellers by offering warranties.
The incentive motive is closely related to the signaling theory. It examines consumers’ and firms’ in-
centives as they pertains to the provision of warranties (Cooper and Ross 1985; Dybvig and Lutz 1993;
Lutz 1989; Mann and Wissink 1989; Priest 1981). An important departure from the signaling motive is
the notion of endogenous risk. That is, both the consumer and firm take privately observed actions that
influence the probability of product failure.34 The producer can save on the production cost by offering less
reliable products, which can only be observed through the probability of breakdown. Similarly, since the
consumer’s maintenance effort is costly and unobserved to the firm, she faces reduced incentive to properly
maintain her product. Or worse yet, she may even have been incented to abuse the product, and in doing
33Akerlof’s logic of market failure is as follows. Given that there is a significant disparity of the available information, the
quality of information, and the ability to process the information between buyers and sellers, each firm has the incentive
to deviate from revealing its true quality level. Knowing this, rational consumers will deem the signal from the seller as
being credible. Consequently, all firms will produce homogenous goods sold at the average price, which reflects the average
quality. In such a setting, high-quality-producing firms are driven out of the market, since the average price may not be
sufficient to cover the incremental cost of providing higher-than-average-quality goods. Anticipating this, buyers, in turn,
expect even lower-quality products, which drives higher-quality-providing firms out of the market. Over time, this results in
market failure.
34 It is also known as the double-moral-hazard problem.
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so, increasing the risk of the product breaking down or failing altogether. Therefore, in general, the intro-
duction of warranties incentivizes the firm to improve the product durability, but also results in reducing the
incentives for consumers to suitably maintain their product. However, it is important to note that the result
of consumer moral hazard depends on whether maintenance and quality are complements or substitutes.
Consumers may increase the level of effort on a higher-quality product if it is more sensitive to the regular
upkeep and maintenance than a lower-quality product. But effort and quality can also be substitutes. This
happens when a high-quality product rarely fails, regardless of the level of maintenance (Lutz 1989). Since
firms design the terms of their warranty contracts based on a private understanding of the true quality of
their product, the effect of consumer moral hazard and how this impacts attachment rates for extended
warranties thus far remains largely unexplored in the literature.
The sorting theory posits that warranties are a credible way for firms to screen consumers. Effective
screening facilitates extraction of greater surplus by price-discriminating across these screened consumers
(Kubo 1986; Matthews and Moore 1987; Lutz and Padmanabhan 1998; Padmanabhan and Rao 1993; Pad-
manabhan 1995). Therefore, firms offer a menu of price-warranty contracts to heterogeneous buyers and,
in doing so, induce consumers to self-select into their preferred warranty terms. The main objective here is
to design a mechanism to efficiently screen consumers with heterogeneous valuations for warranties. Stud-
ies in this domain are variants of models of price-discrimination. The amount of warranty coverage in
sorting models of warranties corresponds to the quantity purchased in a Mussa and Rosen (1987) style price-
discrimination model. A key assumption of the sorting motive is the presence of a heterogeneous preference
for risk aversion amongst consumers (Grossman 1981; Nutz and Padmanabhan 1998).
Kubo (1986) shows that a monopolist can increase its expected profit by selling the product with an
optional-guarantee contract when consumers have heterogeneous preferences for risk. In optional-guarantee
equilibrium, the market is segmented into consumers with and without the guarantee. Price-discrimination
results in a higher (lower) price on the product with (without) a guarantee than in a pure monopoly solution.35
The firm also serves more of the potential market than in a pure monopoly setting . Kubo (1986) uses income
disparity as a source of self-selection such that affluent consumers exhibit higher preferences toward the
insurance than consumers with less means. Sufficient income disparity is necessary to screen the consumers
along their willingness-to-pay for warranties so as to optimally price-discriminate and realize higher profits.
Matthews and Moore (1987) generalize this notion of screening by solving the monopoly-pricing problem
for a multi-product setting, and show that without providing a high-quality product or a warranty contract
35 The pure-monopoly solution is one in which the firm offers products either with or without warranty.
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(intended to attract consumers with higher valuations), the monopolist can still specify a high price and
extract a surplus. Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) show that the optimal combination of price and warranty
can increase a manufacturer’s profit in a market where: (i) consumers exhibit a heterogeneous preference
for risk aversion, and (ii) there is room for consumer-side moral hazard. Padmanabhan (1995) considers
the role of heterogeneity in consumers’ usage of warranties and consumer moral hazard, which then creates
variation in their willingness-to-pay for a price-warranty contract. These aforementioned studies rely on
the strong assumption that the manufacturer is a monopolist in the product and insurance market. Lutz
and Padmanabhan (1998) introduce a third-party insurance firm to examine the competition effects on
manufacturers’ ability to screen heterogeneous consumers using a combination of price, quality, and warranty.
In addition, consumers are assumed to not observe the true quality of the product. Lutz and Padmanabhan
find that the independent insurer enters the insurance market so as to offer extended warranties for the
low-valuation consumers. While manufacturer profits from the high-valuation consumers remain unchanged,
the presence of an independent insurer causes the manufacturer to drop a product intended for low-valuation
consumers, resulting in a reduction in the overall profits for the manufacturer.
Despite the rich body of theoretical research on warranties, the empirical literature on base or extended
warranties is fairly scant. Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) examine how the likelihood of buying extended
warranties is associated with consumer demographics and the length of base warranties using survey data
from new-car buyers on the purchase of an extended-service contract, but do not estimate a demand model.
Soberman (2003) considers a situation in which a seller can use warranties to signal and screen simultaneously.
Through an analytical model, he identifies the optimal strategy for a high-quality seller that offers base and
extended warranties and uses survey data to test his predictions. However, he does not estimate a demand
model. Jiang and Zhang (2011) examine warranties in the context of a distribution channel and study the
impact of a retail service plan in a distribution channel in which the manufacturer offers a base warranty.
Like Padmanabhan and Rao (1993) and Soberman (2003), Jiang and Zhang (2011), too, does not estimate
a demand model for base and extended warranties.
Chu and Chintagunta (2009) estimate a structural demand model of base warranties, but do not investi-
gate the demand for extended warranties. More recently, Chen, Kalra, and Sun (2009) examine how product
characteristics, retailer actions, and consumer characteristics affect the sales of extended warranties, but
do not investigate the role of base warranties. Jindal (2015) is the first and only published study that we
are aware of to structurally estimate the demand for extended warranties. The primary objective of Jindal
(2015) is the clear empirical delineation of the various underlying drivers of risk preferences that rationalize
consumers’ observed extended-warranty choices. Using stated-choice data, he finds that loss aversion more
so than absolute risk aversion or probability-weighting explains consumers’ decisions to purchase extended
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warranties. Much like Jindal (2015), Abito and Salant (2015) also study the drivers of extended warranties,
however they do so using observed-choice data. Abito and Salant (2015) leverages data on consumers’
extended-warranty choices across different product categories (in contrast to Jindal 2015), and find that
probability weighting drives bulk of the demand for extended warranties. However, none of these studies
has jointly considered the interplay between base and extended warranties. Therefore, previous studies offer
limited guidance on how consumers will behave if the durable-good manufacturer changes the base warranty
coverage and/or the underwriter reprices the extended-warranty contract. Last, but not least, all of the
previous empirical studies that do investigate the demand for extended warranties assume that a single
extended-warranty option is offered to all consumers. However, in practice for any durable product, con-
sumers can choose from a menu of extended-warranty options. To the best of our knowledge, our study is
the first to structurally model the demand for extended warranties taking into account the interplay with
base warranties, and the first to design an optimal menu of extended-warranty contracts taking into account
how consumers trade off manufacturer-backed base warranties and extended warranties.
3 Industry Context and Data
The U.S. automobile industry serves as the institutional setting for this study. The automobile industry
is a vital part of the U.S. economy and contributes approximately 3.6%, or $500 billion, to the total GDP
output (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Given its economic significance and rich institutional features,
the automobile industry has had natural appeal for academic inquiry in marketing and economics. The
extant academic literature is rich in insights around pricing (Boyle and Hogarty 1975; Bresnahan 1981;
Berry et al. 1995; Sudhir 2001), consumer-directed price promotions (Pauwels et al. 2004; Bruce et al.
2006), trade promotions (Bruce et al. 2005), channel pass-through (Busse et al. 2006), information search
(Punj and Staelin 1983), leasing versus selling (Desai and Purohit 1998, 1999; Bhaskaran and Gilbert 2005),
new- versus used-car competition (Purohit 1992), consumer-adoption decisions (Schiraldi 2011), dealer-
consumer negotiations (Desai and Purohit 2004), product obsolescence (Levinthal and Purohit 1989), hybrid-
car adoption (Huang 2010; Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011), etc.
Amid the ongoing global economic crisis, the U.S. auto industry has experienced tremendous structural
changes and garnered renewed interest among scholars to study how these changes impact auto buyers and
sellers. This study investigates one such feature of the current marketplace, i.e., consumers’ growing appetite
for extended warranties. Surprisingly, 40% of all auto buyers purchase extended warranties on their vehicles,
despite the fact that the vehicles they purchase come bundled with generous manufacturer-backed warranties
(see Table 1). Automakers prominently feature their base warranties in their consumer-directed marketing
programs. For example, in 1987, Chrysler launched its “best-built, best-backed” TV advertising campaign to
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showcase its expansive manufacturer-backed warranty coverage. Toyota, Ford and General Motors promptly
followed suit and matched the warranty terms set by Chrysler (Guiles 1989). In 1999, Hyundai increased
its powertrain warranty from five-year/60,000-mile to ten-year/100,000-mile. Two years later, in an effort
to boost its market share in the U.S., Kia also began to offer a ten-year/100,000-mile powertrain warranty
on its vehicles.
However, offering such expansive manufacturer-backed warranties is expensive. In the United States,
automakers are also mandated by federal regulations to keep in reserve between 2% to 5% of their annual
revenues to back their manufacturer-backed warranties.36 For example, in 2009, Ford spent $2.5 billion to
cover its costs associated with basic warranty coverage. In addition, it maintained $3.2 billion in reserve for
future warranty expenses (Ford 10-K 2010), a sum roughly equivalent to 3% of the company’s automotive-
sector sales that year (nearly $106 billion). The warranty reserve that Ford set aside in 2009 was greater
than its net income generated by the Ford Motor Company that year ($2.7 billion).
Under acute economic pressure from the ongoing global recession and regulatory requirements, in 2015
many automakers drastically slashed the manufacturer-backed warranties on key brands within their product
line. For example, in late March 2015, Fiat Chrysler announced that it would abandon its standard five-
year/100,000-mile powertrain warranty for all its 2016 model-year vehicles in favor of a five-year/60,000-mile
guarantee. This move followed a similar change enacted earlier that month by General Motors, which reduced
its long-held five-year/100,000-mile powertrain warranties on its Chevrolet and GMC vehicles to a five-
year/60,000-mile plan. In January 2016, BMW announced that it plans to rollback its much touted “No-Cost
Schedule Maintenance” program to three-year/36,000-miles, down from four-year/50,000-mile, for all its 2017
vehicles (Source: BMW Blog).37 Despite the widespread coverage these events received in the popular press,
surprisingly no academic research has systematically explored how these policy changes to manufacturer-
backed warranties have impacted the demand for vehicles from these aforementioned automakers, or what
impact these changes have had on the demand for the optional extended warranties that consumers purchased
on these vehicles. From a managerial standpoint, this study takes the important step of addressing this
important research gap in the academic literature.
We obtained two novel databases from a major auto-industry market-research firm.38 One of these
databases includes detailed transaction-level information for every vehicle purchased at 50 randomly selected
dealerships across Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia between July 2009 and
July 2014. For each transaction, the data contain a VIN identifier of the vehicle purchased, date of purchase,
36Source: Warranty Week 2015
37The new program no longer includes brake pads, brake rotors, wiper blades, engine belts or manual-transmission clutches.
38Our non-disclosure agreement prevents us from disclosing the identity of our data source.
70
age of the buyer, ZIP code of the buyer, odometer mileage, etc. We coded a VIN-decoder that permits
recovery of VIN-specific attributes, including vehicle make, model, trim, model-year, engine size, etc.39 For
each transaction, we know information on the transaction price for the vehicle purchased, whether or not the
sale was accompanied by a trade-in, the price of the trade-in (if any), and the price paid for the extended
warranty (if any). In addition, we observe whether the vehicle purchased was leased, financed or paid in full.
The full dataset contain 135,813 transactions spanning sales of both new and used vehicles.
The second database contains the full repair history for 672,478 VIN-consumer combinations across
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia from July 2007 to July 2014. For each
repair visit, we have detailed information on the date of service/repair, mileage driven since the last repair
visit, what auto parts were fixed, the total billing amount, the total out-of-pocket expense to the consumer,
and the amount of the bill covered by the warranty.
Since vehicle VINs do not directly contain information on the manufacturer-backed factory warranties,
we augmented our previous two databases with a third database compiled by collecting manufacturer-backed
factory information for each make-model-year from the respective automakers’ corporate websites. We report
the factory-warranty terms across key manufacturers and their brands in Table 1. As seen in Table 1, there
is rich variation in factory-warranty terms across manufacturers. Herein, the basic warranty or “bumper-
to-bumper” policy covers the cost of most repairs except normal wear-and-tear (such as the replacement
of oil filters). A powertrain warranty, on the other hand, covers major internal parts of the vehicle, such
as the engine and transmission. Basic warranties are, in effect, between two through five years from the
date when the factory warranty is activated.40 The most commonly occurring basic warranties are three-
year/36,000-mile (41.46%), four-year/50,000-mile (39.02%), and five-year/60,000-mile (7.31%). Powertrain
warranties have more expansive coverage than basic warranties. They range anywhere from two to ten years.
The four-year/50,000-mile (24.39%), five-year/60,000-mile and five-year/100,000-mile (21.95%) are the most
commonly occurring powertrain warranty terms. Both the basic and powertrain warranty terms vary across
manufacturers. For example, Ford (brands include Ford and Mercury), Toyota (brands include Toyota
and Scion), Nissan, Honda, Subaru, Mazda and Volkswagen provide powertrain warranty coverage for five-
year/60,000-mile. In contrast, General Motors (brands include Chevrolet, GMC, and Pontiac) and Chrysler
(with Chrysler and Dodge) offer five-year/100,000-mile coverage. Even within a manufacturer, warranty
terms vary across brands. For example, General Motors, Honda, Nissan and Toyota offer two policies,
and Ford provides three policies, across different brands within their product portfolios. However, warranty
39We built our VIN-decoder using the yearly-vehicle-attribute details generously provided to us by our data source.
40Usually, this happens when the vehicle is originally delivered to the dealer from the assembly plant.
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coverage remains the same across models within the same brand (for example, Hyundai Elentra and Hyundai
Sonata both have five-year/60,000-mile and six-year/100,000-mile coverage). Amongst manufacturers with
multiple warranty policies, the most widely offered combination of basic and powertrain warranties includes
the three-year/36,000-mile and five-year/60,000-mile (35.29%) coverage plans.
In addition to manufacturer-backed factory warranties, buyers (of both new and used vehicles) have
the option to extend the duration of their purchased vehicle’s factory-warranty coverage by purchasing an
extended warranty. By scraping the automakers’ websites, we assembled a fourth database containing the
menu of extended-warranty options offered by each automaker.41Manufacturers can sell extended warranties
either direct-to-the-consumer or through their expansive franchised dealer-network.42Most of the extended
warranties sold by franchised dealerships are marketed and underwritten by the automaker. General Motors
is the only exception. Since coming out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, Ally Financial Inc. underwrites
GM’s extended warranty contracts, which were previously underwritten by GMAC. In addition, third-party
warranty companies such as Automobile Protection Corp., Advantage Warranty Corp., and Universal Under-
writers Service Corp. can also underwrite the extended-warranty contracts sold by dealers (Soberman 2003).
Table 2 presents details on the extended warranties offered by select manufacturers.43 Akin to manufacturer-
backed warranties, automakers also offer a fairly differentiated menu of extended-warranty plans. For exam-
ple, Honda and Mazda sell one extended-warranty policy, while General Motors, Nissan, and Toyota present
three varying coverages for the extended warranties they underwrite. Ford and Volkswagen provide the
most differentiated extended-warranty plans, with four and five products, respectively. The specific terms of
extended warranties also vary across automakers. The Ford-PremiumCARE plan covers 13 major auto parts
with deductibles of $0 to $100 with varying year/mileage limits (one/12,000 to eight/150,000).44 Subaru
Added Security Gold Plus overlaps the most with Ford-PremiumCARE’s coverage in terms of components,
but differs along other dimensions (seven-year/100,000-mile versus eight-year/150,000-mile).
Fusing our four databases at the VIN-consumer level allows us to directly link consumers’ extended-
warranty-purchase decisions (including the menu of extended warranties offered to the consumer and the
premiums paid if they purchased any extended-warranty) with their post-purchase out-of-pocket savings
41Extended warranties can be sold either by the manufacturer, the dealer or a third party. However, the lion’s share of extended
warranties purchased by auto buyers are sold by the automaker. Therefore, in this study, we limit our empirical investigation
to only extended warranties offered by the automakers.
42While auto buyers can purchase extended warranties at any time, these are most often purchased at the point of purchase of
the vehicle at the dealership.
43Ford does not offer zero deductibles for used vehicles.
44These include the engine, transmission, rear-wheel-drive axle, front-wheel-drive axle, steering, brakes, front and rear suspen-
sion, electrical, air conditioning and heating, high-tech, emissions, audio and the safety. These details were obtained from
Ford’s website.
72
from both their base- and extended-warranty coverage. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first
to assemble such a unified database, which affords us a rare 360-degree view of the base- and extended-
warranty market. For the final estimation sample, we have 4,429 B2C transactions that span 14 dealerships
and 16 brands. 45 As seen in the bottom half of Table 23, approximately 29% of our sample auto buyers pur-
chased extended warranties on their vehicles. The lion’s share of these extended-warranty buyers purchased
Regular extended warranties, paying on average a one-time price premium of $898. Only 4% of our sample
auto buyers purchased Comprehensive extended warranties on their vehicles, paying on average a one-time
price premium of $1,220. The average total repair costs incurred on vehicles covered only by manufacturer
warranties is $2,237, which is statistically no different than the average total repair costs incurred on vehicles
covered by optional Regular extended warranties ($2,108) or optional Comprehensive extended warranties
($2,220). If moral hazard were at work, we would expect the total repair costs and claims rate to be higher for
vehicles with optional extended-warranty coverage than without extended-warranty coverage. Since neither
our average total repair costs or our claims rates (2.73%, 2.66%, 2.82%) are statistically different with or
without extended-warranty coverage, we abstract away any moral hazard concerns in our empirical context.
Regular extended-warranty buyers save an additional $327 on average in out-of-pocket expenses relative to
consumers who did not purchase any extended warranties, which is smaller than the premium these consumers
paid to obtain the Regular extended-warranty coverage. The additional out-of-pocket savings incurred by
the consumers who purchased Comprehensive extended warranties relative to consumers who purchased the
Regular extended warranties is $47, which is significantly smaller than the incremental premiums of $321
that they paid to be covered by a Comprehensive versus Regular extended warranty. Interestingly, the in-
cremental savings accrued by consumers who purchase a Comprehensive extended-warranty is statistically
no different from the incremental savings realized by their Regular-extended-warranty-buying peers ($1,214
versus $1,261), despite the incremental premiums paid for additional coverage. Taken together, our data
suggest that consistent with consumer reports, there seem to be limited economic gains from purchasing
extended warranties, and even more importantly, there seem to be little difference in the gains accrued from
purchasing Comprehensive versus Regular extended warranties. Since monetary gains alone cannot ratio-
nalize these choices, these choices must be rationalized by other economic and/or psychological motivations.
Since Chu and Chintagunta (2011) rule out motivations other than insurance and sorting for the provisioning
of warranties in our empirical context, in the discussions that follow we will limit our study only to these
two economic motivations. So as to accommodate these two motivations, in the section that follows we will
allow consumers to be heterogeneous in their risk preference, which not only determines which vehicles they
45We limit the analysis to only B2C transactions to avoid any other motivations to purchase extended warranties such as
corporate policies that may dictate the purchase of extended warranties, as is often the case in B2B transactions.
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purchase, but also drives their decision to purchase optional extended warranties to insure their vehicle after
its manufacturer-backed base warranties expires.
Since our main research objective is to understand and quantify how consumers trade off manufacturer-
backed warranties and extended warranties, we begin by providing some “model-free” evidence to fore-
shadow our structural model discussed in the next section. In Figure 12, we plot the attachment rates of
extended warranties (Y axis) against the manufacturer-backed powertrain warranties that come bundled
with the vehicles purchased (X axis). The plot shows that purchase rates for vehicles with more expansive
manufacturer-backed warranties is significantly higher than for the vehicles with less generous manufacturer-
backed powertrain warranties. If auto buyers are heterogeneous in their risk preference, and as theory pre-
dicts, high-risk-averse buyers purchase vehicles with more expansive manufacturer-backed warranties, then
our model-free evidence suggests that these very buyers are also more likely to purchase extended warranties.
Hence, contrary to aforementioned industry-insider statements that auto buyers treat manufacturer-backed
warranties and extended warranties as substitutes, our model-free evidence seems to suggest that these two
warranties might, in fact, be complements.
4 Model
Our modeling approach builds on the seminal work of Cohen and Einav (2007). We advance a structural
model of extended-warranty choice that rationalizes the observed choices in our data. We assume that each
consumer chooses to buy one of the extended-warranty menu options (i.e., Regular or Comprehensive) or
elects to not buy any extended-warranty coverage on his/her vehicle. Aggregating these decisions across
consumers yields the corresponding demand functions for the individual extended-warranty menu options.
In the empirics that follow, we assume that consumers select between two types of extended-warranty
contracts: Regular and Comprehensive. These two menu options only differ in their mileage-coverage-limit
terms and do not vary in any systematic way in terms of depth of the coverage (i.e., auto parts covered). If
a consumer buys extended-warranty coverage, the total repair cost is deducted by the additional coverage
provided by the corresponding warranty and he/she pays the reminder of the bill amount. If a consumer
does not have any warranty coverage, he/she bears the full repair costs. We assume that consumers are
heterogeneous in their risk preference and that individuals have perfect information about their repair-claim
rates, which allows us to use data on (ex-post) realized claims to estimate the distribution of (ex-ante) claim
rates.
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denote the premium and out-of-pocket costs incurred by individual i when no
extended-warranty is purchased.
Let ui(w) be individual i’s von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. The expected utility v(•) that
















































where πij is the probability of repairs/failure for vehicle j that consumer i purchases. We assume that
πi = λi ∗mi , where λi is the arrival rate of consumer i for repairs which follows a Poisson arrival process. mi
is the miles that individual i has driven since purchasing the vehicle. Our parametric formulation allows us
to flexibly accommodate behaviors often observed in our data where an individual i might visit a dealership
for an oil change, but in the process of the dealer/service operator inspecting the vehicle, the consumer is
informed about parts that may need to be replaced or repaired. For example, given our specification, the
more often a person visits a dealership/service station (because of higher λi), the more likely they will incur
repairs (higher πi) . Also, the more i drives his/her vehicle (higher mi), the more wear-and-tear on their
vehicle, which in turn will warrant more repairs (higher πi) .
Throughout the paper, consumers are assumed that they only ex-ante know the mean of the empiri-




i for their chosen vehicle j, but not the actual ex-post
realizations of these out-of-pocket costs. Note that it is consistent with the standard assumption made
in the signaling theory that consumers know the average quality of the product, but cannot evaluate the
quality of an individual product. We also assume that λi is independent of the extended-warranty choice
(Regular, Comprehensive, No Purchase), i.e., there is no moral hazard.46 Next, we characterize the set
of parameters that will make our representative individual indifferent between either not purchasing any
extended-warranty or purchasing the Regular extended-warranty, and purchasing the Regular extended-
warranty or Comprehensive extended-warranty. As we show below, this characterization provides a lower
bound on the level of risk aversion for the individual which is determined directly from the extended-warranty
46Recall, that we provided statistical model-free evidence in the previous section to support this assumption.
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choice he/she makes. Suppose that our representative consumer were indifferent between buying the Reg-













. The set of parameters characterizing the marginal consumers who
are indifferent between buying the Regular extended warranty against buying the Comprehensive extended
warranty provides lower (upper) bounds on the level of risk aversion for individuals who choose the Com-
prehensive (Regular) extended-warranty for a given λ. Likewise, if he/she were indifferent between not













. The other set of parameters characterizing the marginal
consumers who are indifferent between not buying any extended-warranty versus buying the Regular extend
warranty provides lower (upper) bounds on the level of risk aversion for individuals who choose the Regular















































































The right-hand side of expressions (14) and (16) are the expected gains in utility from choosing the
Regular and Comprehensive, respectively. The left-hand side represents the additional costs for each choice.
For the individual to be indifferent, the expected gains must equal the costs. Assuming that the third
derivative of the u (·) is negligible, the second-order Taylor approximation of both terms in the right-hand
side of equations (14) and (16) yields:






































































where r∗R is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for marginal consumers indifferent between buying the
Regular extended warranty versus no purchase at wealth level w for a specific menu of extended warranties.




























where r∗C is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for marginal consumers indifferent between buying the
Regular and Comprehensive extended warranty at wealth level w for a specific menu of extended warranties.
Equations (20) and (22) provide our indifference sets in the space of risk and risk aversion, which we will
















respectively. Both parameters vary by individual and
are determined by the menu of Regular and Comprehensive extended-warranty contracts offered to the
respective individuals, which can vary by individual depending on the vehicle and the characteristics of
the vehicle chosen. Based on the indifference sets obtained from two types of marginal consumers, we
now consider non-marginal consumers who either choose to buy the Regular or Comprehensive contract










. Our main objective is to
estimate the joint distribution of (ri, λi) – the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and claim rate – in
the population of policyholders, conditional on observables xi. We assume that (ri, λi) follows a bivariate
lognormal distribution and is parameterized as follows:
ln (ri) = x
′
iβ + εi (23)
ln (λi) = x
′
iγ + νi (24)
with  εi
νi











where xi includes observables like consumer characteristics (e.g., age, income, co-buy, etc.) and vehicle
attributes such as make, model, residual miles to expiry of the base warranty, etc. Neither λi nor ri is
directly observed in the data. Therefore, we treat both of these model primitives as latent variables. Loosely
speaking, they can be thought of as random effects. We observe two variables, the number of claims and the
extended warranty choice, which are related to these two unobserved components. Thus, to complete our
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econometric model, we have to specify the relationship between the observed variables and the latent ones.
This is done by making two structural assumptions.
First, we assume that the number of repair visits follows the Poisson distribution as follows:47
visiti ∼ Poisson (λimi) (26)
where λi is an arrival rate and mi is the miles driven by consumer i after the point of purchasing their
vehicle. Second, we assume that consumers make the decision to purchase either a Regular or Comprehensive





















in equations (20) and (22), respectively. Thus, the empirical model for the extended-warranty choice is given
by:


























































With no unobserved heterogeneity in νi, equations (28) and (30) boil down to simple probit models.
However, once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in both εi and νi, we need to integrate over these
two dimensions. We allow the unobservables between ri and λi to be correlated for the following reasons.
Suppose that a risk-averse consumer (for reasons beyond those captured in the observables xi) hears a strange
humming sound in his/her engine. Because the consumer is risk-averse, he/she may visit the dealership to
have the car inspected, which would imply ex-ante a positive correlation between ri and λi. On the other
47An important restriction of the Poisson distribution is that its mean and variance are the same. Although many economic
studies, including ours, employ this assumption, it is often the case that this restriction is falsified or remains untested. The
most common deviation from the Poisson restriction is that of fat tails, i.e., variance that is higher than the mean. This
feature of their data leads researchers to use a negative binomial distribution (NBD), which introduces another parameter to
delink the relationship between the mean and the variance. But the negative binomial distribution can be viewed as a Gamma
mixture of Poisson processes. Consistent with this view, as shown in equation 23, we assume that our claim-generating process
follows a Poisson process at the individual level, but allows unobserved heterogeneity in risk via νi. Thus, our lognormal
mixture of Poisson processes estimates should be very similar to a negative binomial. The dispersion parameter we estimate,
σλ, is a free parameter and, as we discuss in the next section, is identified by the fatness of the tails of the claim distribution.
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hand, there is another risk-averse consumer who purchases an extended-warranty. Because he/she knows
that their vehicle is covered by the extended warranty, upon hearing the same humming sound, this consumer
may delay going to the repair shop until the problem becomes unbearable. In this case, ri and λi will be
negatively correlated. Therefore, rather than placing any restrictions on the form of this correlation, we do
not impose any structure and, instead, let the data speak.
Note that (ri, λi) are unobserved and treated as latent variables. We make two structural assumptions
to make a connection from latent (ri, λi) to related observed variables: the number of repair visits to the
dealership and the choice of extended-warranty contract.
5 Estimation
The maximum-likelihood approach is used to estimate the model, where the likelihood of the data as a
function of the parameters can be written by integrating out the latent variables, namely:
L (visitsi, choicei|θ) = Pr (visitsi, choicei|ri, λi)Pr (ri, λi|θ) (31)
where θ is a vector of parameters containing (β, γ, ρ, σr, σλ). Note, however, that each iteration requires
evaluating a fairly separate, complex integral for each individual in the data. The tried-and-tested method
of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Gibbs sampling is ideal for situations like ours. Using the data
augmentation of latent variables (Tanner and Wong 1987), we simulate (ri, λi) and treat these simulated
draws as if they are the part of data. Instead of evaluating complex integrals, we now need to sample from
truncated normal distributions, which is significantly less computationally demanding (Devroye 1986). The
basic intuition is that, conditional on a draw of (ri, λi), we have a simple linear regression model with two
equations (23) and (24). However, conditional on λi, the posterior of ln (ri) follows a truncated normal
distribution, where the truncation point r∗i (λi) depends on the menu of extended-warranty contracts offered
to individual i . Whether the posterior samples of ri are above or below the truncation point depends on
the decision to purchase or not purchase any extended warranty and the choice of extended warranty (if
any). Conditional on ri, we draw samples from the posterior distribution of ln (λi). This is the only part of
our procedure that is somewhat non-standard. This is because we need to deal with both truncation (which
arises from adverse selection, much like our sampling for ri), and the number of claims, which provides
additional information about the posterior of λi. It follows a truncated normal with two truncation points
that depend on the choice of extended-warranty contract and the number of repair visits. As the posterior
distribution of λi takes an unfamiliar form, we use a “sliced sampler” first advanced in Damien, Wakefield,
and Walker (1999). We do this procedure iteratively until the Gibbs sampler converges. Diffuse priors on θ




 ∼ BV N (0˜, V = Σ ⊗ I) (32)
Σ−1 ∼ IW (a, Q) (33)
where a = 0 and Q−1 = 0. A full description of our Gibbs sampler, including the conditional distributions
and the priors we use, is provided in Appendix 1. Note that each iteration involves generating separate draws
of (ri, λi) for each individual. We run 55,000 iterations of our Gibbs sampler, dropping the first 5,000 draws
where convergence to a stationary is achieved. Then we choose each draw out of every 50 samples to mitigate
any autocorrelation between draws. In the results that follow, we report the results of posterior median and
2.5 and 97.5% quantiles based on these thinning draws.
6 Identification
Our goal in this section is not to provide a formal identification proof, but rather to provide intuition for
which features of the data allow us to identify particular parameters of the model. In the most simplified
case, our model has eight parameters that need to be estimated: the mean and variance of risk (µλ, σλ), the
mean and variance of risk aversion amongst individuals who choose not to purchase any extended warranty or
purchase the Regular extended warranty (µRr , σ
R
r ), the mean and variance of risk aversion amongst individuals
who choose to purchase the Regular extended warranty or purchase the Comprehensive extended warranty
(µCr , σ
C
r ), and the corresponding correlation parameters ρ
R and ρC for these two groups of individuals. The
main difficulty in identification arises from the gap between the (ex-ante) risk type, λi, which individuals
use when choosing their extended-warranty option (including no purchase), and the (ex-post) realization of
the number of claims directly observed in the data. We identify between the variation in risk types and the
variation in risk realizations using our parametric distributional assumptions. Any distributional assumption
that allows us to uniquely back out the distribution-of-risk types from claim data would then be sufficient
to identify the distribution of risk aversion. As stated previously, we make a parametric assumption that
claims are generated by a lognormal mixture of Poisson distributions. Using a mixture enables us to account
for adverse selection through unobserved heterogeneity in risk, while also better fitting the tails of the claim
distribution (see Table 24 for our empirical distribution of the number of claims in our data). As long as there
is sufficient variation in the claims data, alternate parametric assumptions for our claim-generating process
should still facilitate identification. Intuitively, per Table 24, if τ0, τ1,...τ8 be the fraction of individuals with
zero, one, two, three, all the way to eight claims in the data, then µλ can be directly identified from the
average claims rate in the data, while σλ by how much mass exists in the tails of our claims distribution.
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In other words, our mean and variance of risk (µλ, σλ) is identified directly through the variation in the
observed number of visits to the dealerships/repair shops.
Knowing µλ and σλ now allows us to use the observed extended-warranty menu choice as an additional
layer of information to identify the mean and variance of risk-aversion parameters (µRr , σ
R





respectively. Like τ(•), which denotes the fraction of individuals with (•) claims in the data, let $R0 , $R1 ,..,$R8
denote the proportion of individuals who choose the Regular extended warranty within each of these claim
groups. Then the mean of our empirical distribution of $R(•) will aid identification of µ
R
r . In the absence of
correlation between risk and risk aversion, the slope of our empirical distribution of $R(•) will identify σ
R
r ,
while the curvature identifies ρR. This intuition underscores a very important point that identification of ρR
relies on observing individuals who choose the Regular extended warranty with multiple claims, and that it is
likely to be sensitive to the distributional assumptions. Similar intuition holds for identification of (µCr , σ
C
r )
and ρC . More formally, once the distribution of λi is identified, the observed variation in the offered menu









. Recall that these are the lower bounds for the marginal consumers who are indifferent between
no purchase and buying Regular extended-warranty and Regular and Comprehensive contracts, respectively.





the variation between consumers who do not purchase an extended-warranty and those who purchased
the Regular extended-warranty allows identification of ri for Regular extended-warranty buyers. Likewise,




, the variation between consumers who purchase the Regular




To get an initial sense of the claim rates and levels of absolute risk aversion implied by the data, we
begin by running a few reduced-form models. In Table 25 we provide the results from our reduced-form
analysis of key covariates contained in our data on our three dependent variables, namely: (1) the number of
visits to the dealership, (2) the choice of a Regular extended-warranty over no purchase, and (3) the choice
of a Comprehensive extended-warranty over a Regular extended-warranty. The estimates from the Poisson
regression of the number of visits to the dealership is shown in Column 1 of Table 25. This regression is closely
related to the risk equation we estimate in our proposed model. It shows that affluent people are more likely
to visit the dealership. Vehicles with more bumper-to-bumper warranty left are more likely to be brought to
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the dealer. This could either be because people take better care of newer vehicles and/or because these days
many dealerships offer free maintenance service for a select period of time post-purchase of the new vehicle.
Column 2 of Table 25 contains results from a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
the consumer purchases a Regular extended-warranty contract and zero if he/she elected to forego extended-
warranty altogether. We find that younger and lower-income consumers are more risk-averse than their older
and richer peers. Also, consumers who have recently owned a vehicle manufactured by the same automaker,
and the people with co-buyers tend to be more risk-averse than their peers. Consumers who buy more
expensive vehicles are more likely to purchase a Regular extended-warranty than consumers who purchase
less expensive vehicles. The positive and significant estimate for the residual miles to the bumper-to-bumper
warranty expiry suggests that consumers buying vehicles with larger manufacturer-backed warranties are
also more inclined to purchase a Regular extended warranty over forgoing extending warranties altogether.
While this is by no means conclusive evidence, our reduced-form results do suggest that, ceteris paribus,
auto buyers do treat manufacturer-backed warranties and the Regular extended warranty as complements.
Without additinoal imposing structure on the utility function, we cannot conclude if our results are driven by
risk aversion. Column 3 contains the reduced-form results from a logistic regression in which the dependent
variable is equal to 1 if the consumer purchases the Comprehensive extended-warranty contract and zero if
he/she purchased the Regular extended-warranty menu option. Interestingly, here we find that consumers
buying vehicles with larger manufacturer-backed warranties are less inclined to purchase Comprehensive
extended warranties over purchasing the Regular extended-warranty menu option.
7.2 Structural Model Results
We now discuss the estimates from the models outlined in Section 4. In our discussions below, the
corresponding Tables contain the quantiles of the posterior distribution of the parameters of our proposed
model.
Table 26 contains the estimation results from our choice model to either forgo buying any extended-
warranty or purchase the Regular extended-warranty menu option (i.e., equations 23 - 28). The first column
presents the estimation results from the number of visits to the dealership for these consumers. We find that
older consumers are less likely to visit dealerships compared to their younger peers. This could be in part
because they drive far less than their younger peers, and correspondingly incur less wear-and-tear on their
vehicles to warrant visiting a dealership/repair shop. Consumers who purchase more expensive vehicles visit
the dealership more often than those who purchase less expensive vehicles. Perhaps this is because these
consumers are more interested in maintaining their more expensive asset. Another possible explanation is
that the more expensive vehicles come bundled with free maintenance for a limited time post purchase of the
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vehicle. This might also induce higher visit rates amongst consumers who purchase more expensive vehicles.
The second column in Table 26 describes the relationship between buyer characteristics, vehicle attributes
and the coefficient of risk aversion. Younger consumers are more risk-averse than their older peers, and more
likely to buy any extended warranty. This could partly be because older buyers, perhaps through their past
experience, realize that extended warranties have limited benefits, at least when it comes to automobiles.
Consumers who co-purchase their vehicles are more likely to purchase the Regular extended warranty than
others. In our data, many of the co-purchased incidences tend to be parents buying for their children.
Perhaps, the parents in our sample prefer having “the peace of mind” from knowing that their child’s vehicle
is protected. Our results confirm our reduced-form findings that consumers who purchase more expensive
vehicles are more risk-averse, and because they are more risk-averse these consumers are also more likely
to purchase the Regular extended-warranty. It could also be that vehicles that are more expensive are also
more expensive to repair, which leads more people toward purchasing extended warranties. Interestingly,
consumers who purchase vehicles with more expansive manufacturer warranties are more risk-averse than
those who commit to vehicles with less expansive manufacturer warranties. While we do not formally model
the vehicle choice, this estimate is indicative of endogenous self-selection on risk preference. That is, risk-
averse consumers purchase vehicles with more expansive manufacturer-backed warranties, and since they are
risk-averse, they are also more likely to purchase Regular extended warranties. Therefore, our structural
estimates replicate our reduced-form results discussed earlier and do confirm that consumers treat both
manufacturer-backed warranties and extended warranties as complements rather than as substitutes, as has
been suggested in industry reports (at least in our empirical setting). Our structural analysis indicates that
risk-averse consumers seek to insure themselves against unanticipated repairs/costs, and do so to the greatest
extent possible by buying vehicles with more expansive manufacturer-backed warranties and by augmenting
this with additional extended-warranty coverage.
Table 27 contains the estimation results from our choice model to either buy the Regular extended
warranty or purchase the Comprehensive extended-warranty menu option (i.e., equations 23 - 26, 29 - 30).
Here, too, the first column presents the estimation results from the number of visits to the dealership for these
consumers. Apart from the vehicle fixed-effects, the only parameter that is significant here is the coefficient
for vehicle purchase price. Like our previous discussions for Table 26, here, too, consumers who purchase
more expensive vehicles visit the dealership more often than those who purchase less expensive vehicles.
The reasons previously advanced are applicable here as well. The second column in Table 27 describes
the relationship between buyer characteristics, vehicle attributes and the coefficient of risk aversion for the
consumers who either buy the Regular extended warranty or purchase the Comprehensive extended-warranty
menu option. Contrary to our reduced-form results, we do not find any statistically significant impact of
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residual manufacturer warranties on the likelihood of buying a Comprehensive extended-warranty over a
Regular extended-warranty. Since the corresponding coefficient was positive and significant for consumers
who purchase Regular extended-warranty, our structural results do affirm our previous finding that risk-averse
consumers treat both manufacturer-backed warranties and extended warranties as complements rather than
as substitutes. Amongst extended-warranty buyers, buyers of more expensive vehicles are both more likely
to visit dealerships and also exhibit higher risk aversion, i.e., are more likely to commit to a Comprehensive
extended warranty over Regular extended warranty.
The similarity between our structural-model results and reduced-form results for ln (λ) is to be expected,
as this regression is identified primarily from the data on claims. So incorporating the information on
extended-warranty choice does not qualitatively change the conceptual identification strategy. Differences
(if any) are driven mainly by our structural assumptions. Recall that unlike the reduced-form model,
our structural model estimates a lognormal mixture of Poisson rates (because of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity). Incorporating the fatter tails of the claim distribution increases our standard errors and,
therefore, decreases our average predicted-claim rates.
Key to designing and optimally pricing extended-warranty menus is quantifying the level of risk aversion
in the population. Since we use a Gibbs sampler and augment the latent coefficient of absolute risk aversion,
we can directly recover the distribution of risk aversion of individuals we study. At each iteration of the
Gibbs sampler, we compute the mean, standard deviation across individuals, and various percentiles of the
simulated draws of ri and λi, and the correlation between them. In the far-right columns of Tables 25 and 26,
we report the average, median, and standard deviation (across all individuals) of these computed quantities
over the iterations of the Gibbs sampler, as well as the correlations between them. Note that these estimated
quantities are unconditional on observables. We obtain these statistics by integrating over the distribution
of observed individual and vehicle characteristics.
In Tables 28 and 29, we report the various quartiles of our recovered distribution of absolute risk aversion.
The second column in Tables 28 and 29 contain the point estimates for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
at the population mean, median and the respective quartiles. The mean implied risk aversions of Regular
and Comprehensive extended-warranty buyers are 0.031 and 0.048, respectively. To interpret our absolute
risk aversion estimates (ARA), we translate them into a lottery problem and report in column 3 the value
x such that an individual is indifferent about participating in a 50–50 lottery of gaining 100 US dollars and
losing x U.S. dollars. Note that since our estimate is of absolute risk aversion, the quantity x is independent
of wealth w. Our estimates suggest that an average Regular (Comprehensive) extended-warranty consumer
will reject the gamble with the equal chance of winning $100 or losing $21.62 ($14.35). As would be expected,
consumers who purchase Comprehensive extended warranties are significantly more risk-averse than Regular
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extended-warranty-buyers ($14.35 v.s. $21.62). Note that our median level of risk aversion is significantly
smaller than the mean. This is largely driven by our structural assumption that a lognormal distribution
of risk aversion with a large σr always yields a significantly smaller median than mean. Had the extended-
warranty buyer been fairly homogenous in their risk preference, we would see a small difference between the
mean and the median of risk aversion. Therefore, the results suggest that heterogeneity in risk preference is
important, and the median consumer is almost risk-neutral.
As recommended by Rabin (2000), we also contrast our estimates with previous papers that structurally
investigate the extended-warranty market . Our results are consistent with Abito and Salant (2015) where
they find that extended-warranty buyers in the U.S. electronics market will accept a 50-50 gamble with a
loss of $10 if the gain is at least $14. Jindal (2015) reports an extreme degree of risk aversion. He finds that
consumers’ choices of an extended-warranty in the washer category imply that they will reject a gamble that
has an equal chance of winning $100 and losing $5 or less. The difference in the results may be due to the
issues raised by Rabin (2000) regarding the comparability of behavior across different purchase environments
(Einav et al. 2012). Unlike Jindal (2015), which uses the conjoint profiles, this study and Abito and Salant
(2015) use the field data, which might be another potential source of difference in our implied risk aversion
measures vis-a‘-vis those of Jindal (2015).
The Relationship between Unobserved Dealership Arrival Rate and Unobserved Risk Aversion
Tables 26 and 27 reveal an interesting relationship between dealership arrival rate and risk aversion. We
find that unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion (σr) is much greater than the unobserved heterogeneity
in the arrival rate (σλ) in absolute terms (6.108 versus 0.555). This is also true using the dispersion measure
obtained from normalizing the unconditional means of the arrival rate and risk aversion by the coefficients
of variation ( Mean rStd.Dev. r ,
Meanλ
Std.Dev. λ ). This indicates a very important feature of our market - that selection
on risk aversion is more important than adverse selection when it comes to the decision to buy extended-
warranty. Like Cohen and Einav (2007), our results also indicate a strong and significant positive correlation
(ρ) of 0.99 (0.96) between the unobserved arrival rate to the dealership and the unobserved risk aversion for
consumers who either forgo buying any extended-warranty or purchase the Regular extended-warranty menu
option (either buy the Regular extended warranty or Comprehensive extended warranty). As we described
in section 4, our positive correlation can be driven by unobserved omitted factors that are likely to be related
to both dimensions (i.e., repair claim risk and risk aversion). While our result is in line with Cohen and
Einav (2007), it does depart from previous studies that have examined other insurance markets. This further




8.1 Counterfactual 1: Accessing the impact of changes in the manufacturer warranties
One of the key substantive research objectives of this study is to understand how changes to manufacturer-
backed warranties like the ones recently enacted by the likes of General Motors, Chrysler and Tesla Motors
impacts the demand for optional extended-warranty menu options. Therefore, armed with demand-model
estimates, we conduct a series of counterfactual experiments tailored to shed light on these managerially
relevant questions.
Our structural analysis reveals that auto buyers treat manufacturer-backed warranties and extended
warranties as complements rather than as substitutes. Therefore, ceteris paribus, one would expect that
reducing (increasing) the size of manufacturer-backed warranties (i.e., miles to expiry of the bumper-to-
bumper warranty) should also reduce (increase) the demand for extended warranties. However, the economic
impact is slightly more nuanced than that because any changes to the manufacturer-backed warranties will




r ). As shown in Tables 26 and 27, our




λ ) is statistically not impacted by the residual miles to the
expiry of the vehicle’s bumper-to-bumper warranty. Had these parameters turned out to be significant, we





induced by changes to the manufacturer-backed warranties. As shown in Tables 26 and 27, our empirical




λ ) is statistically not impacted by the residual miles to the expiry of
the vehicle’s bumper-to-bumper warranty. Had these parameters turned out to be significant, we would also




λ ) induced by
changes to the manufacturer-backed warranties. This is because each consumer in our model is represented
by a random draw of (ri, λi) from the conditional distribution of the risk aversion and the number of visits to
the dealership, given a set of observable covariates that includes the miles to expiry of the bumper-to-bumper












Since we do not formally model consumers’ choice of vehicle, throughout this section, we make the
simplifying assumption that a consumer’s decision to purchase the chosen vehicle (as observed in the data)
is not impacted by any changes we make to that vehicle’s manufacturer-backed warranty. Conditional on





to buy the Regular extended-warranty over not to buy any extended-warranty contract, or to buy the
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Comprehensive extended-warranty over the Regular extended-warranty plan, or vice versa.
It is worth reminding readers that our critical values r∗i,R and r
∗
i,C are determined by the terms of
the extended-warranty menu options (which remain unchanged) and λi (see equations 20 and 22). Since
λi is not statistically impacted by changes we make to manufacturer-backed warranties, and the terms of
the extended-warranty menu options remain unchanged, our critical values r∗i,R and r
∗
i,C are not impacted
by the changes of manufacturer-backed warranties. We graphically illustrate this point in Figure 13. As
shown in the upper panel of Figure 13, conditional on an existing extended-warranty menu, governed by
our parameter estimates, increasing the length of the bumper-to-bumper warranty results in shifting the




r for buyers of that vehicle to the right, holding fixed r∗i,R and
r∗i,C . Some consumers whose ri is slightly below r
∗
i,R might now drift to the right of r
∗
i,R . These consumers
who previously did not purchase any extended warranties will now purchase the Regular extended-warranty
option. Similarly, some consumers whose ri is slightly below r
∗
i,C might now drift to the right of r
∗
i,C
and in doing so opt to forgo their previously chosen Regular extended warranty for the Comprehensive
extended warranty. The net impact of such changes will be determined by the skewness of our empirical




r . To assess the overall impact on revenues for the underwriter from selling
extended warranties, we increase the manufacturer-backed bumper-to-bumper warranty coverage on each of
our vehicles in increments of 1,000-mile and use our model primitives to predict the individual choices for
each of our auto buyers. We report these in Figure 14. As expected, the overall demand for extended
warranties increases as we offer more manufacturer-backed coverage. By increasing the bumper-to-bumper
warranty by 5,000-mile, the underwriter can realize $933,970 incremental revenues. Interestingly, the bulk
of the incremental revenues come from growing the demand for Regular extended warranties (i.e., getting
more buyers to switch from the outside no-purchase option) rather than getting more people to switch to the
Comprehensive extended-warranty option from their currently chosen Regular extended-warranty option.





for buyers of that vehicle gets shifted to the left, again holding fixed r∗i,R and r
∗
i,C . Some consumers whose
ri is slightly above r
∗
i,R might now drift to the left of r
∗
i,R. These consumers who previously purchased the
Regular extended warranty will now forego purchasing any extended warranty. Similarly, some consumers
whose ri is slightly above r
∗
i,C might now drift to the left of r
∗
i,C , and in doing so, opt to forgo their previously
chosen Comprehensive extended-warranty for the Regular extended-warranty. Therefore, the underwriter
may lose some of his previous demand for the Regular extended warranty to the no-purchase option, but
might also come into additional demand for the Regular extended-warranty from previous Comprehensive
extended-warranty buyers. The net impact of reductions to the manufacturer-backed warranties will be




r . We graphically illustrate
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this in the lower panel of Figure 13.
We quantify the economic impact of reductions to the manufacturer-backed warranties on auto buyers’
switching rates between extended-warranty options and the no-purchase option. Specifically, we reduce the
size of the bumper-to-bumper warranty by 20,000-mile across all our vehicles and use our model primitives
to predict the individual choices for each of our auto buyers. As seen in the top panel of Table 30, ten of
our buyers who previously purchased the Regular extended-warranty now opt out of buying any extended
warranties, while 15 of our Comprehensive extended-warranty buyers will now switch over to buying the
Regular-extended warranty. The underwriter faces a “double whammy” here because each consumer who
switches to the no-purchase option yields no revenues, and each consumer who switches to the Regular option
erodes incremental premiums that the underwriter realizes from the Comprehensive option. Interestingly,
the bulk of the extended warranty switching is borne by Ford Escape. Ford Fusion in unaffected by these
changes. Our results suggest that manufacturers who also underwrite extended warranties might consider
undertaking a very targeted policy change to their base warranties, taking into account the population-level




r ) corresponding to the products that constitute their product line.
8.2 Counterfactual 2: Accessing the impact of changes in Regular extended warranty price

























where ∆pR = pR− 0 and ∆pC = pC − pR . Therefore, changing the premiums on the extended-warranty
menu changes our critical values r∗i,R and r
∗
i,C , but these changes do not impact our population-level




r ). This runs counter to our previous counterfactual exercise in which




r ) change, but the location of our critical values
r∗i,R and r
∗
i,C remain fixed. Therefore, any reduction to the price premiums of our Regular extended-warranty
holding fixed the premiums of the Comprehensive extended-warranty, will change both our r∗i,R and r
∗
i,C .
Interestingly, the new critical values move in opposite directions. Specifically, r∗i,R shifts to the left and
r∗i,C shifts to the right. We illustrate this graphically in the upper panel of Figure 15. Consumers whose
ri is slightly to the left of the original critical r
∗
i,R might now drift to the right hand side of the new value
of r∗R,new . Correspondingly, some of our previous non-buyers will now commit to the Regular extended
warranty. However, at the same time, some of our consumers who are slightly to the right of the original r∗i,C
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will now drift to the left of the new r∗i,C . Therefore, some of our previous Comprehensive extended-warranty
consumers will now switch to the Regular extended warranty. Therefore, reducing the price premium of the
Regular extended warranty will result in garnering new demand from previous non-buyers, as well as drawing
some demand from previous Comprehensive extended-warranty buyers. The net impact on underwriter
revenues will be determined by the rate at which the underwriter is able to attract new consumers who are
previously non-buyers to purchase a Regular extended warranty vis-à-vis the rate at which the underwriter
loses incremental revenues from previous Comprehensive-extended warranty buyers who now purchase the
Regular extended-warranty.
In contrast, when we increase the price of the Regular extended warranty, r∗i,R will shift to the right,
but the critical r∗i,C will drift to the left. We illustrate this graphically in the lower panel of Figure 15.
Therefore, raising the price of the Regular extended warranty will result in some of our previous Regular
extended-warranty buyers opting out of buying any extended warranty, and will spur some of the previous
Regular-extended-warranty-consumers to now switch over to the Comprehensive extended-warranty. The
differential impact of these two forces will determine the net effect on the revenues of the extended-warranty
underwriter.
We changed the price premiums of Regular extended warranties in 5% increments and 5% decrements
and used our model primitives to predict the individual choices for each of our auto buyers. We report these
in Figure 16. We find that increasing the price for Regular extended-warranty by 15% (holding fixed the
price of the Comprehensive extended warranty) yields the biggest increase in revenues for the underwriter.
9 Future Extensions
So far, our model of extended warranty choice is conditional upon the purchase of the vehicle. One obvious
avenue for extension to the current study is to develop a joint model of vehicle and extended warranty choice.
The model outline below builds upon the work of Cardon and Hendel (2001) and Jindal (2015). The problem
we have in mind is a two-stage decision made by an expected-utility-maximizing consumer. In the first stage,
the consumer chooses the vehicle that yields the highest utility given the price and product characteristics.
In the second stage, conditioning on choosing a product, the consumer decides whether to buy an extended
warranty or not, whichever offers the highest expected utility. The problem is formulated as a one period
model where consumers maximize their utility over the duration of warranty coverage.
Let ri be consumer i ’s coefficient of risk aversion, and Xj be the characteristics of vehicle (brand) j, and
bj and ωj be the product and warranty prices, respectively for vehicle j. We denote by pj the probability
of product failure. In the first stage, the consumer chooses which brand to buy. Using the CARA utility
function, the utility consumer i gets from purchasing brand j is given by
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Uij = −e−ri(Xjβi−αibj) + εij
= Vij + εij
(35)
where εij are the random shocks to the utility. We assume the individual-brand-specific shocks εij are
independent (over both i and j ) and identically distributed type 1 extreme value random variables. The






For ease of exposition, we suppress the individual subscript. Conditional on vehicle purchase, the con-
sumer now decides whether to buy the extended warranty or not. The utility from product consumption
is modeled in a static way in the sense that the consumer calculates his expected utility from buying (not
buying) the warranty over the duration of the warranty. We assume that the consumer does not discount
the future and treats the warranty duration as a single period. The consumer is subject to a probabilistic
failure of the product pj , regardless of the choice of extended warranty. In the event of product failure,
the consumer incur an out-of-pocket expense, denoted by OOP . The expected utility of the consumer from



















= V wj + εj,w
(37)



















= V nwj + εj,nw
(38)
Again, we assume that the shocks are type 1 extreme value distributed. Then, the probability of buying
an extended warranty conditional on buying an extended warranty conditional on buying vehicle j is given
by








Let θ be the vector of the model parameters and f (θ) be the density function of θ. Combining equations
36 and 39 and integrating out over the distribution of θ, the expected probability of buying a vehicle with
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the extended warranty can then be written as

















Key identification challenge is to separately identify heterogeneous risk aversion from heterogeneous
product preferences. We assume that the likelihood of purchasing extended warranty is independent of the
consumer’s product preference. Hence, we first recover the preference parameters using the variation in
the vehicle choice. Then, we treat the estimated brand preference parameter as a data and plug-in these
values to estimate the risk aversion utilizing the variation in consumer’s choice of extended warranty. We
implicitly assume that while buying the product, the consumer has preferences for different products which
play a role in the product choice. However, after the consumer chooses the product, he considers his aversion
to risk and the economic gain/loss due to the purchase of extended warranty, which are independent of
the product preference. For example, more risk-averse consumers could purchase extended warranty even
though the premium of extended warranty does not outweigh the savings realized by the extended warranty.
In contrast, less risk-averse consumers would forgo to purchase the extended warranty when he expects
the economic benefit of warranty to be small. Consumer’s behavior with regards to the extended warranty
purchase is more dependent on the his risk aversion and the economic value of the warranty as opposed to
his preference for the particular product.
10 Conclusion
This study structurally examines the market for extended warranties in the U.S. automobile market. Au-
tomobiles, like most durable-goods , come bundled with free limited-time manufacturer-backed warranties.
Yet each year auto buyers spend about $20 billion on optional extended warranties to insure themselves
against costly repairs after the manufacturer-backed warranties expire. This paper is the first (to the best of
our knowledge) to systematically and structurally investigate how consumers trade off manufacturer-backed
factory warranties with optional extended warranties. While previous empirical studies focus exclusively
on manufacturer-backed warranties or extended warranties, we study the role of both manufacturer-backed
warranties and extended warranties within one unified structural econometric demand model. In doing so,
we address an important gap in the empirical literature on warranties first identified by Chu and Chintagunta
(2011). Specifically, we structurally model the demand for a menu of extended-warranty contracts (namely
Regular and Comprehensive) and use the recovered model primitives to help the extended-warranty under-
writer design an optimal extended-warranty menu. Lastly, we use our model to investigate how the demand
for each warranty contract changes in response to the automaker changing the terms of the manufacturer-
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backed warranties that come bundled with its durable goods. Our research is very timely since in March
2015 General Motors and Chrysler drastically cut their manufacturer-backed warranties on their flagship
brands, while Tesla Motors increased its manufacturer-backed warranty coverage.
Contrary to statements made by industry insiders, we find that risk-averse consumers treat manufacturer-
backed factory warranties and extended warranties as complements rather than as substitutes. This is
because risk-averse buyers endogenously self-select into vehicles with greater manufacturer-backed factory
warranties, and because they are risk-averse, they are also more likely to purchase extended warranties. Our
findings suggests that auto makers such as General Motors and Chrysler may be engaged in self-defeating
behavior when it comes to warranties. Here’s how: Because auto makers believe that consumers don’t
consider manufacturer warranties to be critical in their decisions to purchase a vehicle, these auto makers
have begun reducing the length of the manufacturer warranty. By doing this, they alienate the most risk-
averse consumers, who actually do desire to purchase a vehicle with an expansive manufacturer-backed
warranty. The auto makers risk losing these risk-averse consumers to competing manufacturers who are
offering more expansive warranties. In doing so, the auto makers experience a “double whammy” - losing
both the opportunity to sell these risk-averse consumers a vehicle, and losing the opportunity to sell them
an extended warranty, as these risk-averse consumers would have been the most likely to have purchased
an extended warranty. Now that these risk-averse consumers have been alienated, the remaining consumers
attracted to these manufacturers who have cut back their warranties tend to be less risk-averse, and therefore
are even less likely to purchase an extended warranty than their risk-averse peers. This suggests that auto
makers should be more targeted when making decisions about rolling back warranty protections. This is the
most important insight of our paper. However, our model also identifies opportunities where manufacturers
can enact reductions to their manufacturer-backed warranties in a more targeted fashion and still continue
to the reap the benefits from selling extended warranties. In line with other insurance settings, we show
that, in the extended warranty market, too, the selection on risk aversion is far more important than adverse
selection when it comes to the decision to buy an extended warranty.
As warranty provisioning becomes an important element of the marketing mix, and as aggressive mar-
keting of extended warranties comes under greater scrutiny by policy makers, we hope our study will spark
future empirical research on warranties and address other aspects of this economically significant market.
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Table 23: Summary Statistics
Variable Nobs Mean Std. Dev.



























pR/4OOPR 4429 15.27 47.64
4pC/4OOPC 4429 142.2 381.82

































1 114 (0.63) 57 (0.31) 11 (0.06) 182 (1.00) 0.04
2 1186 (0.71) 426 (0.25) 59 (0.04) 1671 (1.00) 0.37
3 1346 (0.71) 459 (0.24) 80 (0.04) 1885 (1.00) 0.43
4 469 (0.73) 145 (0.23) 26 (0.04) 640 (1.00) 0.14
5 15 (0.71) 3 (0.14) 3 (0.14) 21 (1.00) 0.005
6 18 (0.75) 2 (0.08) 4 (0.17) 24 (1.00) 0.005
7 1 (0.25) 2 (0.5) 1 (0.25) 4 (1.00) 0.001
8 1 (0.5) 1 (0.5) 0 (0.00) 2 (1.00) 0.001
Notes 1: Numbers in parentheses in each cell represent percentages within each row.
Notes 2: Right-hand-side column presents the marginal distribution of the number of claims.
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Log-likelihood -3177.45 -1935.14 -429.54




Note: The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% confidence level.
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Note: 95% credible regions are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% confidence level.
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Note: 95% credible regions are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% confidence level.
97
Table 28: Risk-Aversion Estimates - Regular Extended-Warranty Buyer
Specification Absolute Risk Aversion Interpretation
Back-of-the-Envelope 0.0032 75.64
Proposed Structural Model
Mean Individual 0.031 21.62
25th Percentile 1.24 · 10−6 99.98
Median Individual 3.05 · 10−6 99.97
75th Percentile 5.77 · 10−6 99.94
90th Percentile 9.31 · 10−6 99.9
95th Percentile 1.195 · 10−5 99.8
Comparable Estimates
Abito and Salant (2015) 0.03 22.26
Jindal (2015) 0.14 5
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Table 29: Risk-Aversion Estimates - Comprehensive Extended-Warranty Buyer
Specification Absolute Risk Aversion Interpretation
Back-of-the-Envelope 0.04 17.1
Proposed Structural Model
Mean Individual 0.042 16.32
25th Percentile 2.3 · 10−8 99.99
Median Individual 8 · 10−8 99.99
75th Percentile 2.2 · 10−7 99.99
90th Percentile 4.85 · 10−7 99.99
95th Percentile 1.177 · 10−6 99.98
Comparable Estimates
Abito and Salant (2015) 0.03 22.26
Jindal (2015) 0.14 5
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Figure 12: Model-Free Evidence
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Figure 13: Changing the Length of the Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty
Case (1): Increasing the Length of Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty
Case (2): Reducing the Length of Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty
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Figure 14: Impact of Increasing the Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty on Retailer’s Revenues
103
Figure 15: Changing the Price Premium of the Regular Extended Warranty (A Graphical Illustration)
Case (1): Increasing the price of Regular-EW
Case (2): Reducing the price of Regular-EW
104
Figure 16: Revenue Impact of Changing the Price Premium of the Regular Extended Warranty
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APPENDIX
Algorithm 1 Description of Gibbs Sampler
The likelihood functions are specified as follows:
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Step 2: Draw samples from
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Algorithm 2 Description of Gibbs sampler (cont’d)
Step 3: Draw [ln ri|β, γ,Σ, λi, Xi, choicei]∝ [choicei|ri, λi, r∗i (λ)] [ri, λi|β, γ,Σ, , Xi]
(ln ri|choicei = 1, ...) ∼ N
(










I (ri ≥ r∗i (λi))
(ln ri|choicei = 0, ...) ∼ N
(










I (ri < r
∗
i (λi))
Step 4: Draw [lnλi|β, γ,Σ, ri, Xi, visitsi, choicei,mi]
∝ [visitsi|λi,mi] [choicei|ri, λi, r∗i (λ)] [ri, λi|β, γ,Σ, , Xi]
(lnλi|choicei, ...) ∼ b0 (λi) b1 (λi) b2 (λi)
where
b0 (λi) ∼ N
(










[I (choice = 1) (λi ≥ λ∗i (r))
+I (choice = 0) (0 ≤ λi < λ∗i (r))]
b1 (λi) = λ
visitsi
i
b2 (λi) = exp (−λimi)































u1i |u2i , lnλi, ...
] [
u2i |u1i , lnλi, ...
]










u2i ≤ exp (−λimi)
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From the joint distribution,



































− lnmi is the upper bound for lnλi. Thus, we can just sample





the Gibbs sampling procedure is described by the directed acyclic graph (DAG) below.
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